Power, Trust & the Fear of Losing Control

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MMMM welcome to be on the
boardroom.

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I am very excited to pick your
brain about all things PII was

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thinking of how to introduce
you, you know, so that the

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audience understand who you are
and really like your skills and

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your talents and all these
things.

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I think the way to sum it up in
the, in the simplest form is

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that I would describe you as the
absolute creme de la Creme of

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the private investigation world.
Not only are you yourself a

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talented private investigator,
but you run an entire massive

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company leading private
investigators, and you're on all

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these forums and all these
associations of private

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investigators.
So I'm just going to let you

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describe what it is that you do.
OK.

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So thank you actually for being
on this, this podcast, this

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opportunity.
So I, I consider myself a

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professional international
investigator.

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That, that that's what I would
consider myself moving away from

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the term private investigator
because when you hear the term

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private investigator, most
people assume rain Max

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newspapers with holes in, you
know, eating Donuts in the back

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of a car, watching someone
secretly.

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So the role of an investigator
has changed since when I started

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to what it is now.
And that if you were to say,

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when someone says to me, what do
you do?

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I'd say I'm an international
investigator, a professional

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international investigator or a
professional investigator.

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Still the term Pi but moving
from private to professional.

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Wow, you're an investigator,
right?

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So.
In the private.

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Sector in the private sector.
So I mean, I was having a little

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laugh with my husband all the
way here because I was like,

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Mike probably knows what we're
talking about right now.

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Careful what you say.
Mike probably knows what I had

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for breakfast.
Mike knows how much we've got on

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our bank accounts.
Mike knows exactly what emails

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I've sent, how prepared for this
podcast, everything about our

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lives and so on.
That's probably an exaggeration

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is there?
But if you wanted to know.

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That's a huge exaggeration.
I mean, look, you, you need a

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reason, you need, you know, a
case is, is mounted for a

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purpose and a reason.
And then we, we kick it off that

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way so we wouldn't be looking at
your emails and your bank

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accounts.
Alexander that you can't.

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You can't really do that in the
private.

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We'll get to what you cannot do.
OK, so when is it necessary then

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to hire someone such as
yourself?

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OK, so we're, we, we are what we
call a distress purchase.

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So you don't book us like you
book a holiday for next year or,

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or anything like that.
So there must, there has to be

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an event in your life where you
require understanding what

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happened, how it happened and
trying to connect those

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historical dots.
Usually you've, you're involved

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in a situation where you've got
no clarity and that could be a

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private, a private person
situation, matrimonial for

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example, you've been scammed,
you've been defrauded by someone

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either online virtually or, or,
or one of your, someone you do

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business with.
So there's an event that's

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happened and you need to try and
connect the dots.

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That's where we come in.
OK.

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So you want to connect the dots,
we call, you pick up the phone

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and you connect the dots.
So what kind of a person then

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typically hires?
We generally work for three

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groups, the legal teams, so
lawyers representing individuals

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who have had issues or who
require intelligence or

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investigative support,
litigation support, corporates

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that have ongoing issues.
And that could be anything from

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screening employees that start a
new position, doing KYC and DD

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on business checks and mergers.
Sorry, know your know your

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client KYC, you know, that's
quite a big thing to do at the

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moment in terms if you're doing
business with a third party, you

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need to know who you're working
for or who you're doing business

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with and making sure there's no
red flags there.

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So those are consented checks
that we would do for corporate.

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And then the third group, which
can sometimes be the most

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interesting group are family
offices.

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And family offices cover private
individuals, but but private

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individuals of a certain say
let's say mid stroke high net

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worth who have independent
family offices managing their

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their family.
Oh, OK, so legal lawyers,

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corporate and then.
Family offices, which cover

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private individuals as well.
Yeah.

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So those are the three groups.
OK, OK.

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Typically, and probably I'm
leaning more towards the private

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individuals here.
What is the emotional state of

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these clients when they come to
you?

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What's the most typical?
Is it distressed?

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Is it curious?
Is it vindictive revenge?

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What?
What's the main sort of vibe you

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get on an emotional level?
There is when it's someone

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personal, if it's a business
transaction, it's very black and

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white, OK, that you've got a
reason to hire us and we're

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going to uncover those facts and
present a report.

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When it's family situation, then
there is emotion that can cloud

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judgement and there is sometimes
not only cloud judgement on the

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the client side, but cloud
judgement in terms of

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proportionality, in terms of how
far you keep going.

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Because hiring an investigator
can sometimes be addictive.

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And I'll tell you why.
Yeah, I was.

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Going to ask you, actually.
I'll tell you why, yeah.

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If you believe that someone in
your trusted circle is behaving

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inappropriately and that doesn't
necessarily mean an affair or

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anything like that, it could be,
you know, anything that they

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shouldn't be doing and you
mount, you decide to contact an

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investigator to conduct a period
of surveillance, for example, to

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confirm or deny whether there's
been any inappropriate

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behaviour.
That power in terms of

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monitoring a third party and
knowing where they're going, who

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they're meeting and what they're
doing to the right type of

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client who has maybe a addictive
personality because a lot of the

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higher net worth individuals are
in those positions because they

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are motivated to succeed.
Can on occasion, and I'm not

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saying this is a as a blanket
statement, but can on occasion

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become addicted to the
information and these. 100%,

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especially if you've got someone
a little bit controlling, you

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know, and successful people like
to control the outcome, which

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determines more success.
So yes, I can see that actually.

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So this puts the balance on the
professional investigator to do

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what's proportionate and
legitimate to the case.

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We're gonna, we're gonna get 2
morals.

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We're gonna get tomorrow's OK.
But yes, so you've got this.

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So yeah, there is the type of
person that will most likely

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come to you.
And there are intentions and

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emotional triggers, especially
on the private side.

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And you're saying on the
corporate side, it's much more

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black and white.
You know, we just want to know

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facts here.
It's not personal.

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It's just more facts.
And yes, unless you have a

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corporate, which we've done many
of these 222 scenarios, 1 is

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when individuals of say, I don't
know, senior management are on

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gardening leave and they're
running a group of clients.

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Generally in the fund world
where senior managers are

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running client money, fund money
and on gardening leave and they

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may poach clients to another
competitor.

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There can be some emotion in
there because that's a position

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of power and or an internal
insider threat, someone selling,

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stealing company secrets,
someone trying to damage the

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brand, the board, depending on
the company can become a little

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bit, well, we want to go after
this individual.

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We need to know who, why, how
and who's communicating, what

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are the next steps and, and what
can we do?

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So they'll consult their legal
teams, they'll consult their

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investigation intelligence teams
and work out a strategy in terms

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of getting a solution.
So there's there's a few moving

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parts and that always happens in
the journey of an investigation.

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OK, So what won't you legally
take on?

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So we'll, we'll take anything
that's legal.

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So as long as we're legally
allowed to do it, what we won't,

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what you can't do, and.
Let me rephrase it.

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Sorry, what won't you take on?
What sort of cases will you not

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touch?
So we have an on boarding

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process and any client that
comes to us will need to do our

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usual KYC.
Like I said to you before,

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knowing who we're working for,
the reasons why we need to have

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a legitimate interest to
investigate.

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We can't.
You can't just say to me, hey,

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Mike, I want you to follow that
person there for a month.

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Why?
I need to know why, what you're

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trying to achieve what?
What are we doing this?

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What's the purpose, what's the
intent?

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And I need to make sure that we
are providing proportionate

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investigative tools to achieve
your objective.

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I need to confirm really whether
you've got a case or not.

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And this isn't stalking or
harassment, right?

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Wow.
So you really have a proven case

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that you guys will say right
that that's fair you.

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Know yeah, yeah, we we would
yeah, we would have the

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consultation.
We understand what the reasons

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are we will provide the the
tools and the methods.

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It may not be surveillance is
the tool.

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It may be that we can do
alternative research to provide

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you the results that you need.
So we would on board you

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properly things that we don't do
in misconceptions.

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Can you hack someone's phone?
I want to go into someone's bank

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account.
I want to go and see everyone's

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emails.
Can you look at their WhatsApp

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messages, all these things when
a client asks you that at the

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first time, at the first
question, I know that this

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client isn't really clear in
what what they need.

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So I, my question is what you're
trying to achieve.

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So I want you to get, I want all
the WhatsApp messages my husband

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sent for the last month.
Well, what, what, what is the

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purpose, what you're trying to
achieve?

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Oh, you want to know whether
he's having an inappropriate

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relationship?
OK, Well, going into his

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WhatsApp message is 1 illegal, 2
probably may not give you the

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information, right?
It may not, It may not give you

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the answers that you need.
So let me, as your professional

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investigator, tell you the steps
that we can do legally,

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ethically.
We're going to get to Chief.

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Sure.
I want to know that I have a

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problem, but I want to know.
I want to know about that

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particular one.
But OK, so you have to onboard

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them properly.
You've got to know there's a

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case, then you take it on.
Yeah.

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So for a private individual, he
wants to know something, you

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know, let's just say there is
some cheating.

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Would it be legal for me or
anyone else watching to say?

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But I would, I would like to
hire you to investigate this

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potential case of cheating.
Is that legal?

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It's it's definitely legal.
It needs to be proportionate.

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So you couldn't say to me, hey,
Mike, can you follow my husband

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for the next five years or the
next six months just just to see

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that he's put 1 foot wrong?
It's disproportionate to the

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aim, right?
You, you know, if you're saying,

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oh, my husband's coming back
home on a Tuesday and Thursday

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night regularly from this work
drinks.

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He's always got work drinks or
he's playing.

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Yeah, he's playing snooker every
Thursday.

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He's never plays snooker.
Where's that come from?

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Or there's a his routines
change.

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Actually dressing differently,
he looks a bit better.

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He's using perfume.
He's using.

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Less exactly then you're
thinking.

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There's something not quite
right here there.

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That's my legitimate interest.
I understand.

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OK, so we're going to step a
little bit away from that and

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just into being a private or how
you say international

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investigator.
So do you have to have certain

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skills like how do you determine
whether someone and, and you,

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you hire these investigators?
So what skills do you need in

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terms of personality, skills and
education?

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Like, well, how?
How do you even become one?

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Yeah, actually, right.
Again, that role has changed.

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When I started in the industry
most people were either ex

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military, ex police.
Military.

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Yeah, ex intelligence and whilst
there is that still in the

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market, we've got a lot of
younger investigators that are

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interested or younger
individuals that are interested

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00:11:49,880 --> 00:11:53,160
in a career in private
professional investigation work.

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So there's skills for justice
and MVQ Level 3 courses out now

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00:11:57,200 --> 00:12:02,080
that never work.
It's, it's, it's a relatively,

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00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:05,800
let's say it's an introductory
course to the world of private

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00:12:05,800 --> 00:12:07,480
investigations.
OK, so there's a course you.

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00:12:07,480 --> 00:12:10,760
Can, yeah, you can actually
attend now and, and do that and

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00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:12,480
become qualified.
I'll tell you one thing

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00:12:12,480 --> 00:12:16,120
Alexandra, there's no licensing
for the investigation in the UK

237
00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:18,760
at the moment.
There's no legal license to

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practice, which is pretty
strange because interesting.

239
00:12:22,680 --> 00:12:27,840
Yeah, the UK is one of the
oldest countries that have a

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00:12:27,840 --> 00:12:30,480
private investigation world.
Let's say it hasn't.

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00:12:30,520 --> 00:12:31,960
Lasted so long without a
license.

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00:12:32,240 --> 00:12:35,840
So we are self regulated.
So I, I'm the president of the

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00:12:35,840 --> 00:12:38,360
Association of British
Investigators, which is a group

244
00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:41,520
of professional investigators in
the UK and overseas actually.

245
00:12:42,080 --> 00:12:44,960
And we are self regulated.
So in order to become a member

246
00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:48,240
of this association, you need to
have a clear criminal record

247
00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:50,520
check.
There's you need to be clear of

248
00:12:50,520 --> 00:12:54,560
any, there's credit, there's a
couple of references you need to

249
00:12:54,560 --> 00:12:58,960
have indemnity and insurance.
So there's a whole, there's a

250
00:12:58,960 --> 00:13:04,040
whole on boarding process and
those investigators, some 400

251
00:13:04,880 --> 00:13:08,400
that represent the association
are all found on on the website.

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00:13:08,400 --> 00:13:10,680
So if anyone needed an
investigator, let's say locally

253
00:13:10,680 --> 00:13:12,760
in a certain jurisdiction, you
could find one there that's been

254
00:13:12,760 --> 00:13:15,440
vetted and checked.
So there is no license.

255
00:13:15,440 --> 00:13:18,560
So and you're asking me about
what, what skills you need?

256
00:13:20,480 --> 00:13:23,400
Great question.
So now we've got individuals

257
00:13:23,400 --> 00:13:26,600
coming into the market with
journalist type skills, banking

258
00:13:26,600 --> 00:13:28,840
skills, legal understanding the
legal system.

259
00:13:28,880 --> 00:13:32,640
So the role of an investigator
is changing and changed, and it

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00:13:32,640 --> 00:13:35,480
will continue to change.
About like spy skills and

261
00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:39,800
manipulation skills or like, you
know, I mean, whether you're a

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good communicator or not, all
those sort of things.

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00:13:41,680 --> 00:13:43,360
I mean journalists.
That's probably communication.

264
00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:45,880
Yeah, communication, reading
people knowing how to people.

265
00:13:45,880 --> 00:13:49,800
Yeah, knowing how to ask a line
of question and if you're taking

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00:13:49,800 --> 00:13:53,680
an interview, for example, those
skills can be pretty useful.

267
00:13:54,480 --> 00:13:57,720
Languages, a lot of people
overlook that speaking more than

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one language because we are in a
small and ever reducing global

269
00:14:03,920 --> 00:14:05,520
landscape.
But lots of people have more

270
00:14:05,520 --> 00:14:07,720
than one footprint around the
world nowadays, right?

271
00:14:07,720 --> 00:14:10,800
Especially with access to global
data, social media and whatever

272
00:14:10,800 --> 00:14:13,120
else.
So a lot of the individuals we

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00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:16,240
investigate have international
connections and speaking and

274
00:14:16,240 --> 00:14:20,560
understanding foreign cultures,
languages, processes, what you

275
00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:22,520
can and can't do.
It's very important as well to

276
00:14:22,520 --> 00:14:26,200
become a well-rounded
investigator as well as as well

277
00:14:26,200 --> 00:14:30,040
as understanding how to navigate
databases, intelligence

278
00:14:30,040 --> 00:14:32,800
gathering, field work.
There's quite quite a lot of

279
00:14:32,880 --> 00:14:35,240
moving parts so.
Yeah, of course, because, yeah,

280
00:14:35,240 --> 00:14:38,000
you are global and you've got
these investigators all around

281
00:14:38,000 --> 00:14:40,680
the world and you can tap into
your resources wherever it is,

282
00:14:41,040 --> 00:14:42,400
whichever countries there won't
name any.

283
00:14:42,400 --> 00:14:45,560
But yeah, you want to tap in and
know that they know how to

284
00:14:45,560 --> 00:14:47,680
behave in that country and not
stick out like a sore thumb and

285
00:14:47,680 --> 00:14:50,800
draw attention to themselves and
then blow the case, right?

286
00:14:50,800 --> 00:14:53,360
I mean, it's part of it.
Yeah, if you're, if you're

287
00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:55,120
actively on the ground and
you're working in a foreign

288
00:14:55,120 --> 00:14:58,640
jurisdiction, yeah, you'd need
to body up with local expertise.

289
00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:03,440
Oh, OK.
So it's legal.

290
00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:06,320
There are certain skills that
you would need to have.

291
00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:12,120
So earlier before before the
podcast, we touched a little bit

292
00:15:12,160 --> 00:15:15,880
on AI and that whole side of
things because obviously AI is

293
00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:20,040
now massive.
So can you know someone like

294
00:15:20,040 --> 00:15:23,240
yourself, an investigator, track
someone's movements just using

295
00:15:23,240 --> 00:15:26,920
social media and public data and
a combination of AI?

296
00:15:26,920 --> 00:15:28,200
Is that sort of?
Is that enough?

297
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:32,120
It's laying up.
So we everyone now has two

298
00:15:32,120 --> 00:15:35,000
reputations.
We've got this reputation, your

299
00:15:35,000 --> 00:15:38,480
physical reputation, and you
have your online footprint, your

300
00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:39,320
online reputation.
Wow.

301
00:15:40,520 --> 00:15:42,920
That's scary thinking you have.
It like that you need to protect

302
00:15:42,920 --> 00:15:45,280
both right?
Nowadays, especially if you are

303
00:15:45,280 --> 00:15:49,520
online and you, you know, you
either conduct your business or

304
00:15:49,520 --> 00:15:52,200
you're, you're active, you need
to protect both those

305
00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:54,880
reputations.
So, but there's a caveat.

306
00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:58,760
You can also pretend to be
whoever you want online as well.

307
00:15:58,760 --> 00:16:02,480
So for an investigator, we're
very, very eyes wide open in

308
00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:05,840
terms of when we're looking at
available open source data.

309
00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:11,440
There are numerous tools out
there that we use to scrape and

310
00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:15,240
analyze online footprint,
whether you can just use AI on

311
00:16:15,240 --> 00:16:20,120
its own at the moment.
I'm an old school investigator,

312
00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:22,560
right?
Whilst we leverage the tools

313
00:16:22,560 --> 00:16:25,080
that are out there and those
tools are evolving all the time.

314
00:16:25,680 --> 00:16:28,840
Rapidly.
And some of the younger guys in

315
00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:31,840
the team are a lot more skilled
and try and close cases from

316
00:16:31,840 --> 00:16:33,800
their desks.
So every time I'm in my office I

317
00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:37,240
say like you cannot close a case
just by sitting at your machine.

318
00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:41,520
So whilst you believe you may
have found everything, get out

319
00:16:41,520 --> 00:16:44,720
on the street, go and go and do
the covert work.

320
00:16:44,720 --> 00:16:46,560
Go and do the interviews.
Go and do those.

321
00:16:46,560 --> 00:16:48,200
Inquiries.
There's more to it, yeah.

322
00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:50,280
Well, you've, you've done a
complete, complete check.

323
00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:53,320
You haven't just scraped the
data that you've found, put

324
00:16:53,320 --> 00:16:55,800
together the report and come to
a conclusion.

325
00:16:56,080 --> 00:16:59,520
Go and speak to neighbors.
Go and speak to do do some field

326
00:16:59,520 --> 00:17:01,440
stuff.
Yeah, that's where you're going

327
00:17:01,440 --> 00:17:02,560
to get real.
You're.

328
00:17:02,560 --> 00:17:03,800
Right.
It's the only part of the

329
00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:05,319
picture.
I mean, we know for ourselves

330
00:17:05,359 --> 00:17:07,800
it's not the full picture of who
you are online.

331
00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:11,760
There is who you actually are.
Offline, you're right and and

332
00:17:11,760 --> 00:17:15,480
the the younger generation
coming in are leaning more

333
00:17:15,480 --> 00:17:18,400
towards online desktop tools
only.

334
00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:22,319
And I see that shift when I
started where there was no AI,

335
00:17:22,319 --> 00:17:25,200
no, no online, there was hardly
any databases to be honest with

336
00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:26,160
you.
A lot of that we had to go to

337
00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:30,000
the libraries and micro fish and
look for, you know, registries

338
00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:33,240
physically taking hours and
hours and hours looking through,

339
00:17:33,240 --> 00:17:36,040
you know, small bits of data to
try and find whatever he was

340
00:17:36,040 --> 00:17:37,440
looking for.
Whereas now you see like, you

341
00:17:37,440 --> 00:17:40,080
know, it's a millisecond.
So I think that's going to

342
00:17:40,080 --> 00:17:42,200
change even more.
OK, so I've got a question for

343
00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:43,320
you.
So I've got my phone.

344
00:17:43,560 --> 00:17:48,240
So this has been debated about
for a long time, but you know,

345
00:17:48,480 --> 00:17:52,000
is your phone actually tracking
what you're saying?

346
00:17:52,320 --> 00:17:54,520
I mean, there's all these
different companies and things

347
00:17:54,520 --> 00:17:57,800
that might be tapping into this
technology and then feeding you

348
00:17:57,800 --> 00:17:59,720
the ads off the back of what
they hear.

349
00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:02,520
Your Alexa, your whatever,
whatever, your Google Ness,

350
00:18:02,520 --> 00:18:04,840
whatever it is that you're using
all these devices listening to

351
00:18:04,840 --> 00:18:07,120
us and then feeding back the
ads.

352
00:18:07,360 --> 00:18:12,240
And can it then be used in a
corrupt way saying, by the way,

353
00:18:12,240 --> 00:18:15,200
can you guys say anytime they
mention this or they talk about

354
00:18:15,200 --> 00:18:19,520
this, give me that information?
That's quite sinister and dark,

355
00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:21,160
isn't it?
That's like having someone in

356
00:18:21,160 --> 00:18:24,560
your house spying on you.
OK, that's a brilliant question

357
00:18:24,640 --> 00:18:26,600
and I get asked this quite a
lot.

358
00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:33,640
OK, in the short answer is yes,
OK, but the long no, but the

359
00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:36,760
long answer there, there you
know there, there are some steps

360
00:18:36,760 --> 00:18:39,160
through this process there.
Are so we're being spied on,

361
00:18:39,280 --> 00:18:42,120
basically.
So you use the word spied, OK.

362
00:18:42,160 --> 00:18:45,320
And that's where that's where
this is differentiated.

363
00:18:45,400 --> 00:18:48,760
When you download an app from,
whether it's the App Store,

364
00:18:48,760 --> 00:18:51,000
Google Play, wherever you're
downloading your apps from,

365
00:18:51,440 --> 00:18:56,480
there are some non consensual
and consensual privacy policies.

366
00:18:56,640 --> 00:18:58,520
No one's reading that.
No, no.

367
00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:01,560
And and some of that does
collect location data,

368
00:19:01,840 --> 00:19:04,680
information data, some things
that you put in you can send to

369
00:19:04,680 --> 00:19:07,600
give in your e-mail, you can
send to sharing your analytics,

370
00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:10,080
for example, how you're using
your device and how you're

371
00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:13,360
interacting on that particular
app and that information is

372
00:19:13,360 --> 00:19:15,440
shared.
That's this is where GDPR come

373
00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:20,400
in, in 2018 to protect the
consumer against mass marketing

374
00:19:20,920 --> 00:19:23,880
that was that was going on
there, you know, unsolicited

375
00:19:23,880 --> 00:19:26,200
marketing emails and calls and
whatever else solicited.

376
00:19:26,400 --> 00:19:30,440
So, so there are apps, numerous
apps can can send you track your

377
00:19:30,440 --> 00:19:33,480
location, but they need to, some
of them need to, and I'm going

378
00:19:33,480 --> 00:19:37,760
to give you the examples now,
Deliveroo, Uber, any of the maps

379
00:19:37,760 --> 00:19:40,400
you use, they need to know where
you are in order for you to use

380
00:19:40,400 --> 00:19:43,680
the service.
So you know if you are going to

381
00:19:43,680 --> 00:19:46,400
consent your location
information to those types of

382
00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:48,640
apps, only do it whilst you're
using the app.

383
00:19:48,640 --> 00:19:53,120
So you can you can highlight
select consent to share only

384
00:19:53,120 --> 00:19:56,520
whilst using the app, not always
you have always whilst using the

385
00:19:56,520 --> 00:19:57,160
app.
Corner.

386
00:19:57,240 --> 00:19:59,640
But are they listening to you?
Are they listening to you?

387
00:19:59,640 --> 00:20:03,360
Some may be, some may listen.
OK, it's it's there are numerous

388
00:20:03,360 --> 00:20:06,320
platforms that can access the
microphone, the camera.

389
00:20:06,320 --> 00:20:07,760
Why are they?
Do they really need to be

390
00:20:07,760 --> 00:20:09,280
listening to what I'm saying at
home?

391
00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:13,360
I tell you, that's a great.
Your phone is listening to

392
00:20:13,360 --> 00:20:14,400
multi.
Area that one.

393
00:20:14,520 --> 00:20:15,920
Your phone is listening to you
all the time.

394
00:20:16,240 --> 00:20:17,760
Just say hey Siri to your phone
now.

395
00:20:17,760 --> 00:20:18,920
No, I.
Don't but.

396
00:20:19,160 --> 00:20:20,440
But have you got it disabled?
Right?

397
00:20:20,640 --> 00:20:23,520
So, but what I'm saying to you
is it it's listening to you.

398
00:20:23,520 --> 00:20:28,760
So, so it not to spy on you, but
to make your life that you've

399
00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:31,880
chosen, that you think you've
chosen with your device easier.

400
00:20:32,200 --> 00:20:33,920
That's how you no, I understand
that, yes.

401
00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:36,400
And that's what it is.
And people go, oh, your devices

402
00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:41,840
are spying on you.
OK, using the word spying is

403
00:20:41,840 --> 00:20:46,000
where that's a third party
trying to target and listen to

404
00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:48,160
what you're doing in your
personal time without your

405
00:20:48,160 --> 00:20:49,840
consent.
Yes, that's spying.

406
00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:56,120
So the apps and the phones and
the technology and the use of

407
00:20:56,120 --> 00:21:01,520
say voice automated recognition
and tools, that's I don't put

408
00:21:01,520 --> 00:21:03,920
that in the same category as
spying.

409
00:21:04,160 --> 00:21:08,640
But of course the technology is
there, so you will have people

410
00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:11,160
that try and take, you know, a,
a knife can be used, you know,

411
00:21:11,160 --> 00:21:14,520
to to cut something open, you
know, to slice an apple.

412
00:21:14,520 --> 00:21:16,400
It can also be used in knife one
in the back.

413
00:21:16,600 --> 00:21:19,720
So exactly that is the I mean.
Great analogy.

414
00:21:19,720 --> 00:21:21,640
And that's the same thing.
And it's the same thing.

415
00:21:21,640 --> 00:21:26,720
Should we ban knives?
Good point, good point.

416
00:21:26,720 --> 00:21:31,320
However, so in, in, in the world
that you're in, I mean, you

417
00:21:31,320 --> 00:21:34,360
might let, obviously you
wouldn't use sinister tactics

418
00:21:34,360 --> 00:21:37,640
like that, but there might be
others that are using that

419
00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:40,360
against one of your clients.
And in that case you would have

420
00:21:40,360 --> 00:21:42,440
to come in and investigate and
go, well, hang on a minute.

421
00:21:42,760 --> 00:21:44,720
Now you're tracking exactly what
they're supposed to say in their

422
00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:46,400
private time and you're finding
out information.

423
00:21:46,400 --> 00:21:49,880
And I mean, that could be
seriously awful.

424
00:21:49,880 --> 00:21:52,240
Everything you say at home, in
the privacy of you know who

425
00:21:52,240 --> 00:21:56,000
you're talking about, what
you're saying, your financial

426
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:58,040
details, any investments you're
making.

427
00:21:59,240 --> 00:22:02,240
I mean, yeah, look, if you're if
you've been targeted by a group

428
00:22:02,400 --> 00:22:04,160
and and that this happens right
it.

429
00:22:04,360 --> 00:22:05,600
Does happen.
Yeah, if you.

430
00:22:05,600 --> 00:22:08,680
Yeah, dependent, yeah.
You know, depending on who, who

431
00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:12,960
the ultimate client is and their
motivation, we've been called in

432
00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:16,960
to conduct technical sweeps.
So what that means is you go in

433
00:22:16,960 --> 00:22:21,800
with scanning equipment and you
do what's called a physical and

434
00:22:21,800 --> 00:22:25,720
a technical search of the office
or the residential address and

435
00:22:25,720 --> 00:22:30,920
you're checking for listening
devices, forum frequencies, bugs

436
00:22:31,080 --> 00:22:34,720
as we call them, transmit,
hidden cameras, anything that

437
00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:36,440
could have been installed by a
third party.

438
00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:39,520
I mean risks.
Nowadays, these devices, if you

439
00:22:39,520 --> 00:22:43,920
were just a Google bug or hidden
camera or hidden microphone,

440
00:22:44,080 --> 00:22:46,720
they're so accessible.
Years ago it was very you needed

441
00:22:46,720 --> 00:22:50,240
to be a, you know, a secret MI 5
agent to be able to deploy this

442
00:22:50,240 --> 00:22:51,760
kit years ago.
Now you can go and buy any

443
00:22:52,600 --> 00:22:55,040
miniature bugs online for.
My house Swift listen when I'm

444
00:22:55,080 --> 00:22:57,560
when I bought I do.
I don't want to swift.

445
00:22:57,880 --> 00:23:00,080
I'm getting really paranoid now.
There was an article in the in

446
00:23:00,080 --> 00:23:00,720
the Pred.
Yeah.

447
00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:02,800
There was an article in the in
it was discussed in the news

448
00:23:02,800 --> 00:23:06,960
yesterday about landlords
putting covert cameras in.

449
00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:08,080
Oh, yeah.
Did you see that?

450
00:23:08,120 --> 00:23:09,720
Right.
So we we wrote something about

451
00:23:09,720 --> 00:23:13,080
that.
Yeah, to spy on their tenants

452
00:23:13,360 --> 00:23:14,840
and, and someone went to prison
for it.

453
00:23:14,840 --> 00:23:18,840
So we're now in the top end, top
end rental property addresses.

454
00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:22,960
We are before, let's say I don't
know, a family want to rent from

455
00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:25,280
overseas in London for a year or
whatever else.

456
00:23:25,440 --> 00:23:29,480
We're going in to do a technical
sweep to make sure that that

457
00:23:29,480 --> 00:23:33,160
property is safe and secure, so.
OK, so I'm going to ask you

458
00:23:33,160 --> 00:23:35,640
something.
So we we were in an Airbnb the

459
00:23:35,680 --> 00:23:39,560
other day and we're just
watching whatever Mamma Mia or

460
00:23:39,560 --> 00:23:43,000
something like that.
And then the Alexa device came

461
00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:48,160
on and it was actually a child
talked to us and was like making

462
00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:50,480
silly sounds like, you know, you
know, whatever.

463
00:23:50,480 --> 00:23:54,160
So then my daughter talked back,
was like, and that kid talked

464
00:23:54,160 --> 00:23:55,920
back.
So there was a connection, a

465
00:23:55,920 --> 00:24:00,040
remote connection to the
property that we were staying

466
00:24:00,040 --> 00:24:01,720
in.
I mean, that can't be.

467
00:24:01,720 --> 00:24:04,160
I mean, we've obviously raised
it, but that's not legal, no.

468
00:24:04,160 --> 00:24:07,320
No, that's yeah, you're you're
that's the invasion of your

469
00:24:07,320 --> 00:24:08,840
privacy.
Yes, right there.

470
00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:11,960
No, that's that's not.
And you you did raise it with

471
00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:12,880
Airbnb.
Yeah, we did.

472
00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:16,480
Yeah, we raised it with Airbnb.
You'd be surprised how common

473
00:24:16,480 --> 00:24:18,040
this really is.
Now it's.

474
00:24:18,240 --> 00:24:20,520
Not right.
It's not right, it's not legal,

475
00:24:20,520 --> 00:24:23,360
it's not ethical, but you're
going to have some owners who

476
00:24:23,360 --> 00:24:26,240
maybe have had their Airbnb
properties trashed or had

477
00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:31,120
issues, right, that want to
protect themselves.

478
00:24:31,440 --> 00:24:35,920
But also what I've also found
is, and it's usually in the sort

479
00:24:35,920 --> 00:24:38,600
of high net worth celebrity
celebrity arena where they're

480
00:24:38,600 --> 00:24:41,640
staying in top end hotels.
People know that.

481
00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:44,120
Let's say for example, I know
you've got the Film Festival or

482
00:24:44,120 --> 00:24:48,840
something big coming into town
and you're targeting, you're an

483
00:24:48,840 --> 00:24:52,520
investigative individual who
wants to get some dirt or wants

484
00:24:52,520 --> 00:24:54,280
to get a story to try and make
some money.

485
00:24:54,760 --> 00:24:57,280
They may stay in these nice
hotels and put something in

486
00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:59,200
there.
So check in, stay in the hotel,

487
00:24:59,800 --> 00:25:02,120
put something in, check out and
then in the hope that a

488
00:25:02,120 --> 00:25:04,600
celebrity will stay in this nice
room.

489
00:25:05,800 --> 00:25:10,000
Goodness, I'm never.
Saying no, no, but no, no, I'm

490
00:25:10,000 --> 00:25:11,840
not.
I'm not saying that happens all

491
00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:15,360
the time, but but then you have
some of these high net worth

492
00:25:15,720 --> 00:25:17,120
that will have their rooms
swept.

493
00:25:17,120 --> 00:25:18,960
That is just part of their
security protocol.

494
00:25:19,320 --> 00:25:22,160
I want to have that done now I
have been considered because I

495
00:25:22,160 --> 00:25:24,760
do feel uncomfortable going into
hotel and I do.

496
00:25:25,080 --> 00:25:27,560
It's not paranoid mine.
I do sort of think, well, what

497
00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:30,840
if there's a camera in here or
there might be, you know, it's.

498
00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:32,280
Hard.
Well, well, yeah, there might be

499
00:25:32,480 --> 00:25:35,160
usually, you know, some of the
rooms you stay in the top end

500
00:25:35,160 --> 00:25:38,760
rooms, Alexandra, you know that
you know those that you don't

501
00:25:38,760 --> 00:25:42,640
know.
I mean, I remember years ago, I

502
00:25:42,640 --> 00:25:44,680
won't mention the hotel.
It's in central London.

503
00:25:46,480 --> 00:25:49,960
We were looking after some
foreign dignitaries for a week

504
00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:54,080
and in the in the room sweeping
we check all the rooms.

505
00:25:54,600 --> 00:25:57,280
One of the these rooms provided
laptops to their guests.

506
00:25:57,280 --> 00:26:00,360
This was a long time ago where
they had like laptops in the

507
00:26:00,360 --> 00:26:03,080
room.
The laptop was open and there

508
00:26:03,080 --> 00:26:07,240
was a whole e-mail account open.
So we checked and it was someone

509
00:26:07,360 --> 00:26:16,000
super well known and we emailed
back saying your, your laptop

510
00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:17,600
has been left.
We're a security team.

511
00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:20,920
Your laptop has been left open.
Don't worry, we've closed it

512
00:26:20,920 --> 00:26:23,200
down.
And the, the, you know, so any

513
00:26:23,200 --> 00:26:25,520
unauthorized third party
restriction, there's no risk.

514
00:26:25,920 --> 00:26:27,920
And this individual emailed
back, thank you.

515
00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:29,320
And that was that we didn't have
any more.

516
00:26:29,760 --> 00:26:34,440
But if that was not us, let's
say for example and a cleaner or

517
00:26:34,440 --> 00:26:35,960
a.
Yeah, you can sell that

518
00:26:35,960 --> 00:26:37,800
information.
Huge information.

519
00:26:37,880 --> 00:26:40,720
I mean that it was, you know,
all their personal details, all

520
00:26:40,720 --> 00:26:43,080
the communication between who
this individual was and third

521
00:26:43,080 --> 00:26:45,760
parties.
It was huge.

522
00:26:46,640 --> 00:26:49,240
You know that is huge that.
Is huge selling like this was?

523
00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:52,080
Blow up.
Blow up it was over 1010 years

524
00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:54,680
ago but there you go you know
those risks exist it's.

525
00:26:56,040 --> 00:26:59,280
Frightening.
OK, so we touched on this a

526
00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:04,280
little bit, but if, if let's say
I wanted to hire someone just to

527
00:27:04,280 --> 00:27:07,400
find out if if I'm being
watched, can I do that?

528
00:27:07,640 --> 00:27:10,320
So I'm just worried that.
You've been tracked.

529
00:27:10,520 --> 00:27:13,960
Tracked, stalked, harassed,
blackmailed, for example.

530
00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:18,040
Yeah, we do that that, that,
that would there's a few lines

531
00:27:18,040 --> 00:27:19,480
of service there.
So there'll be counter

532
00:27:19,480 --> 00:27:23,120
surveillance of a team that
would work with you to make sure

533
00:27:23,120 --> 00:27:25,600
that you're not being watched,
monitored.

534
00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:29,440
We will check your online
footprint as well to see whether

535
00:27:29,440 --> 00:27:33,560
there's any third parties that
are routinely monitoring you

536
00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:35,280
Monitoring.
Stalking.

537
00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:39,040
What about like the trolls
online that get out of hand if

538
00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:41,520
you have one of those super
trolley trolls that keep

539
00:27:41,520 --> 00:27:44,480
spamming you and harassing you
if you have if that I mean that

540
00:27:44,480 --> 00:27:47,520
exists.
Look, yeah, again, it's, it

541
00:27:47,520 --> 00:27:49,920
depends on the individual.
It depends on on the case.

542
00:27:49,920 --> 00:27:53,320
But you know, there are certain
steps you can take to block

543
00:27:53,320 --> 00:27:55,360
those.
And the more in the public eye

544
00:27:55,360 --> 00:27:59,360
you are, the more risk you have
of that, to be honest with you.

545
00:27:59,360 --> 00:28:01,480
And it's part and parcel of
putting yourself out there, I'm

546
00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:07,720
afraid, unless of course,
there's a, a blackmail issue,

547
00:28:07,720 --> 00:28:11,920
which is a criminal offence.
So for example, I'm going to do

548
00:28:11,920 --> 00:28:15,120
this if you don't do this.
And it doesn't have to be money,

549
00:28:15,120 --> 00:28:18,000
it could be anything.
So any blackmail, any blackmail,

550
00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:20,480
that is we, we investigate those
routinely.

551
00:28:21,640 --> 00:28:24,160
And that, that is where we try
and connect the dots in terms of

552
00:28:24,520 --> 00:28:27,280
identifying the individual or
third parties behind the

553
00:28:27,280 --> 00:28:30,320
attempt.
And we'll either work with a

554
00:28:30,320 --> 00:28:32,800
legal team to get a cease
synthesis letter going on or.

555
00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:36,040
What about if like a threat,
like a threat to your safety or

556
00:28:36,040 --> 00:28:38,080
something, I'm going to get you
or something like that.

557
00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:41,600
That must happen a lot.
Threat to life, threat to

558
00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:43,000
safety.
To your family.

559
00:28:43,000 --> 00:28:48,000
Yeah, that that happens again.
Again, our response needs to be

560
00:28:48,000 --> 00:28:50,120
proportionate.
If these if these individuals

561
00:28:50,120 --> 00:28:53,040
are open and they're not hiding,
so their identities are open,

562
00:28:53,040 --> 00:28:54,920
then there are there's the
authorities that will get

563
00:28:54,920 --> 00:28:56,720
involved in.
We can do that.

564
00:28:57,000 --> 00:29:01,120
If they're hiding, then there
are other ways that we can try

565
00:29:01,120 --> 00:29:03,960
and connect the dots, but we're
we're pushing for the social

566
00:29:03,960 --> 00:29:06,480
media companies to step up as
well and do a little bit more.

567
00:29:06,800 --> 00:29:10,360
Yeah, it's the IT is.
It can be whilst there is

568
00:29:10,360 --> 00:29:13,400
somewhat going on, it can be the
world W at times as well where

569
00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:14,680
you can see what's going on
online.

570
00:29:14,680 --> 00:29:17,360
You know there are bots that
have been created just to.

571
00:29:17,680 --> 00:29:20,040
To harass and foment people,
yeah.

572
00:29:20,720 --> 00:29:24,560
So have you ever had a client
lie to test or trick you?

573
00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:27,960
Have you ever had a a situation
where the side that's asked you

574
00:29:27,960 --> 00:29:29,960
to do something?
I'm going to ask, I'm going to

575
00:29:30,120 --> 00:29:36,680
take, I would say this statement
now is everybody lies, Everybody

576
00:29:36,680 --> 00:29:39,400
lies.
OK, think about that.

577
00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:45,960
And whether you're whenever you
put your case across everyone

578
00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:48,920
not, I'm not saying they're
lying for the right or wrong

579
00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:51,800
reasons, but everyone does and,
and whoever says they'd never

580
00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:53,680
lie is, is lying.
So.

581
00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:57,320
Well, my grandmother used to say
that white lie that she was, you

582
00:29:57,320 --> 00:30:00,320
know, very Christian woman and
she's to confess in the church

583
00:30:00,320 --> 00:30:02,240
for hours and hours in that she
never did anything wrong,

584
00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:05,080
literally wouldn't harm fly.
But she said you know that the

585
00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:09,880
time when it's OK to lie is a
white lie to protect somebody or

586
00:30:09,880 --> 00:30:12,120
to not everyone needs to know
everything.

587
00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:14,640
If you then because I'm so
honorable, I want to tell the

588
00:30:14,640 --> 00:30:17,080
truth all the time.
Well actually your truth might

589
00:30:17,080 --> 00:30:20,440
be so incredibly damaging and
cause chaos and disrupt the

590
00:30:20,440 --> 00:30:25,360
whole world system, sometimes
just gently life.

591
00:30:26,680 --> 00:30:29,280
So a white lie is a lie or not,
or not a lie.

592
00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:31,600
I think you've got to look at
the greater picture.

593
00:30:31,600 --> 00:30:33,440
You can't beat.
So you've got to look at like,

594
00:30:33,440 --> 00:30:36,720
look, sometimes you've got to
think about the greater benefit

595
00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:38,400
to everyone.
That wasn't my question.

596
00:30:40,320 --> 00:30:42,760
It's a lie.
See, everybody lies, right?

597
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:48,120
Yeah, it's a lie.
So would a, would a client put

598
00:30:48,120 --> 00:30:50,840
their case across in a
particular way to make it look

599
00:30:50,840 --> 00:30:52,680
like we need to do what we need
to do?

600
00:30:53,440 --> 00:30:56,080
Yes, but what?
But the skill is the

601
00:30:56,080 --> 00:30:58,920
investigator.
The skill is the investigator in

602
00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:03,240
understanding the client
requirement, going through the

603
00:31:03,560 --> 00:31:06,960
questioning, let's say the
onboarding and getting to the

604
00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:10,000
truth that that's, that's what a
skilled investigator will do and

605
00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:13,960
then providing the solution.
But we, we have, you know, every

606
00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:18,160
week we have numerous crazy type
enquiries that want to do all

607
00:31:18,160 --> 00:31:19,760
sorts of weird and wonderful
things.

608
00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:24,640
And through the that process you
end up understanding your

609
00:31:24,640 --> 00:31:26,840
position with a client.
I just, I just love what you do.

610
00:31:26,880 --> 00:31:29,120
I love that you because you
know, there's this whole thing

611
00:31:29,120 --> 00:31:33,520
about my truth much I actually
really despise that term.

612
00:31:33,520 --> 00:31:35,680
What does my truth mean?
There is the truth.

613
00:31:36,200 --> 00:31:38,400
Then there's how you frame it.
Then there's how someone else

614
00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:39,840
frames their points of views,
opinions.

615
00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:41,520
Some people have terrible
memories.

616
00:31:41,960 --> 00:31:43,840
Some people are so obsessed with
their points of view that they

617
00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:45,680
become skewed.
They really believe their own

618
00:31:46,160 --> 00:31:47,560
truth and I'm going to call it
lie.

619
00:31:47,880 --> 00:31:49,960
So there's all of that mess up.
But actually, when you

620
00:31:49,960 --> 00:31:54,520
investigate calmly and neutrally
and sensibly, you uncover the

621
00:31:54,600 --> 00:31:56,240
truth.
Exactly.

622
00:31:56,240 --> 00:31:58,400
Well, the other thing an
investigator does is report

623
00:31:58,400 --> 00:32:02,920
fact.
So we get this is fact, it's

624
00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:04,640
evidence and we're backed with
evidence.

625
00:32:04,640 --> 00:32:07,240
You can't just put together a
package of hearsay.

626
00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:10,200
It's going to get thrown out.
So you know, we we get the fact.

627
00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:14,400
So how can you get away from now
there could be circumstantial

628
00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:17,360
evidence, There could be, but
you have to list that.

629
00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:21,200
You don't put that as a fact
because you can't back it up

630
00:32:21,200 --> 00:32:23,960
with documented primary source
evidence.

631
00:32:24,200 --> 00:32:27,680
Yes, and you know what else I
feel like when with a fact thing

632
00:32:28,240 --> 00:32:32,760
that what people do, what they
actually do, that's a fact.

633
00:32:33,320 --> 00:32:36,240
You know what what they've done
their record, whether it's

634
00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:39,840
online record, whatever it is,
that is a fact that isn't you

635
00:32:39,840 --> 00:32:42,920
can't dispute that you did that.
That is what happened.

636
00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:44,840
You know, whether you're a
country, whether you're

637
00:32:44,840 --> 00:32:46,720
whatever, either you did
something and when people show

638
00:32:46,720 --> 00:32:51,760
you who they are through their
actions or companies or even

639
00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:54,480
entire governments, you've got
to pay attention to that and

640
00:32:54,480 --> 00:32:57,800
take it as facts, right?
The other thing though, just to

641
00:32:57,800 --> 00:32:59,960
throw something completely
different is this whole thing

642
00:32:59,960 --> 00:33:03,320
called misinformation.
So it's spreading third party

643
00:33:03,320 --> 00:33:07,200
misinformation lies.
So but with a narrative

644
00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:09,640
misinformation with a narrative
in the wrong hands can be really

645
00:33:09,640 --> 00:33:13,640
dangerous because it's pursuing
to say that that information is

646
00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:16,840
true when it isn't.
Yes, and, and and on the back of

647
00:33:16,840 --> 00:33:22,160
this narrative campaign, for
example, can create first and

648
00:33:22,160 --> 00:33:26,080
second phase people around that
to believe this narrative that

649
00:33:26,080 --> 00:33:28,560
doesn't exist and that's.
Extremely dangerous.

650
00:33:28,560 --> 00:33:31,600
And that's why I'm moving away
from what people say and then

651
00:33:31,600 --> 00:33:34,000
narratives and misinformation
and their headlines.

652
00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:37,800
And it's like, what have you
actually shown to be true?

653
00:33:37,800 --> 00:33:41,520
Like what action have you done?
Even as a country, it doesn't

654
00:33:41,520 --> 00:33:44,240
matter what you say and what you
try and paint.

655
00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:45,720
It's like, what have you
actually done?

656
00:33:45,720 --> 00:33:46,920
What are you?
What's your credentials?

657
00:33:46,920 --> 00:33:51,280
And it's like a CV Hopefully
it's like, what have you done

658
00:33:51,280 --> 00:33:52,920
step by step?
Yeah, exactly right.

659
00:33:53,040 --> 00:33:54,560
And we deal with that.
You deal with that.

660
00:33:54,600 --> 00:33:57,840
Well, we try and peel the layers
and try and get to the raw data.

661
00:33:58,360 --> 00:34:01,920
I love that.
I love facts and data.

662
00:34:03,240 --> 00:34:06,600
So has someone ever confronted
you or your team?

663
00:34:06,640 --> 00:34:11,080
You know your your employees in
in when investigating, have you

664
00:34:11,080 --> 00:34:13,920
been caught out, let's say?
Very, very rarely.

665
00:34:14,400 --> 00:34:16,679
And it does happen.
Any investigator that says it

666
00:34:16,679 --> 00:34:19,400
doesn't happen is lying, but it
does happen.

667
00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:21,800
And I'll tell you why.
Where the risk goes up,

668
00:34:22,320 --> 00:34:24,960
generally when if there's two
sides, there's always two sides

669
00:34:24,960 --> 00:34:28,880
to an investigation.
And if both sides have defenses

670
00:34:28,880 --> 00:34:32,679
and investigators working and
the information is being

671
00:34:32,679 --> 00:34:36,320
disclosed at some point, let's
say in a court case, there could

672
00:34:36,320 --> 00:34:41,239
be the risk goes up in terms of
the subject becomes aware.

673
00:34:41,239 --> 00:34:43,480
Now there's an investigation
going on, there's been documents

674
00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:45,719
that have been served.
There's there's a report that's

675
00:34:45,719 --> 00:34:48,520
been exhibited, it becomes,
yeah, it becomes that that's

676
00:34:48,520 --> 00:34:50,760
where the risk goes up.
But again, a skilled

677
00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:53,120
investigator will take
proportionate measures and and

678
00:34:53,120 --> 00:34:55,199
do the right type of
investigating during that

679
00:34:55,199 --> 00:34:56,960
process.
Cover their tracks.

680
00:34:57,400 --> 00:35:01,760
Yeah.
Have you ever or your team had

681
00:35:01,760 --> 00:35:04,040
to pose as someone to get
information?

682
00:35:05,480 --> 00:35:10,560
Yeah, you can do and, and again,
yes, you can.

683
00:35:10,760 --> 00:35:12,200
It depends.
If you're knocking on someone's

684
00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:14,400
door and you need to find out
some information, you're going

685
00:35:14,400 --> 00:35:15,840
to say, hey, I'm an
investigator, I need to ask.

686
00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:19,560
People are going to close up.
So it may be that you use what

687
00:35:19,560 --> 00:35:24,840
we call a cover story to
interact with an individual or a

688
00:35:24,840 --> 00:35:26,880
third party.
As long as you don't pretend to

689
00:35:26,880 --> 00:35:29,920
be someone that's real.
OK, yeah.

690
00:35:30,480 --> 00:35:31,560
Then this is a real.
Yeah.

691
00:35:31,560 --> 00:35:33,960
Yeah.
You're impersonating someone

692
00:35:33,960 --> 00:35:36,880
official or something, an
individual that you shouldn't.

693
00:35:37,280 --> 00:35:39,000
Then you know, there's some laws
against that.

694
00:35:39,000 --> 00:35:43,680
But you know you you can be
creative in your approaches.

695
00:35:43,920 --> 00:35:45,600
OK.
So this one is more again for

696
00:35:45,600 --> 00:35:47,840
the private side of the
individuals.

697
00:35:48,320 --> 00:35:52,000
When you're investigating and
someone asks you for help and

698
00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:55,480
you're investigating another
person, what is like obvious red

699
00:35:55,480 --> 00:35:59,160
flag, suspicious behaviour that
you might find in someone, let's

700
00:35:59,160 --> 00:36:02,840
say if they cheating or if they,
you know what, what sort of red

701
00:36:02,840 --> 00:36:04,560
flags immediately jump out at
you?

702
00:36:05,240 --> 00:36:09,560
In terms of before what, what
for the person to look out for

703
00:36:09,560 --> 00:36:11,880
or when we're when we're
following someone, yeah.

704
00:36:12,000 --> 00:36:13,960
When we're investigating, when
you're asked to investigate

705
00:36:13,960 --> 00:36:17,920
someone, what are like red flags
that someone's doing something

706
00:36:17,960 --> 00:36:20,080
dodgy?
Like is there something that you

707
00:36:20,080 --> 00:36:24,400
quickly notice in maybe they
covering up their tracks or some

708
00:36:24,400 --> 00:36:27,240
sort of suspicious activity,
immediate red flags that they're

709
00:36:27,240 --> 00:36:30,880
not quite right or there's
something a bit suspicious

710
00:36:30,880 --> 00:36:32,520
about?
Again, if we're looking at a

711
00:36:32,520 --> 00:36:35,720
matrimonial situation and let's
say the individual is in

712
00:36:35,720 --> 00:36:38,560
communication with their partner
whilst the investigation is

713
00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:39,640
going on.
So whilst the surveillance is

714
00:36:39,640 --> 00:36:42,960
going on, you know the
individual, and we've had this

715
00:36:43,400 --> 00:36:45,360
quite regularly where the
individual will communicate with

716
00:36:45,360 --> 00:36:48,080
their their partners saying I'm
leaving work now by, you know,

717
00:36:48,080 --> 00:36:53,920
message when really they're not.
So those white lies that someone

718
00:36:53,920 --> 00:36:58,880
tells someone is a red flag
because why would you do that?

719
00:36:58,920 --> 00:37:03,920
Are you justifying or I'm just
in this meeting with X when

720
00:37:03,920 --> 00:37:05,240
you're not, you're at a
different location.

721
00:37:05,240 --> 00:37:06,120
Why would you?
Yeah, why?

722
00:37:06,440 --> 00:37:08,720
Are you hiding?
Why are you creating again a

723
00:37:08,720 --> 00:37:12,480
misinformation narrative to your
partner or hiding something and

724
00:37:12,480 --> 00:37:14,640
that for us would think that
that's not quite right?

725
00:37:14,840 --> 00:37:16,680
So misinformation is a massive
red flag.

726
00:37:17,120 --> 00:37:19,120
I think so, yeah.
Because you're, you're you've no

727
00:37:19,120 --> 00:37:21,400
reasons.
When there's no reason to lie

728
00:37:21,640 --> 00:37:24,320
and you lie, That for us is a
concern.

729
00:37:24,320 --> 00:37:27,120
There's always a reason.
There's always a reason to lie.

730
00:37:27,120 --> 00:37:29,800
Oh.
Scary.

731
00:37:30,480 --> 00:37:33,720
Do people often regret what they
find, you know, when they ask

732
00:37:33,720 --> 00:37:35,080
you and then the truth comes
out?

733
00:37:35,080 --> 00:37:37,680
Or is it a sort of a yes?
What's the most common?

734
00:37:37,720 --> 00:37:39,760
Yeah, that's a really good
question.

735
00:37:39,760 --> 00:37:42,520
And that ranges I've had.
I've had clients that are

736
00:37:42,680 --> 00:37:45,280
emotionally invested and
connected to understanding

737
00:37:45,280 --> 00:37:48,560
what's going on because what we
find out is going to change the

738
00:37:48,560 --> 00:37:52,520
direction of their path.
Gosh, fundamentally change

739
00:37:52,520 --> 00:37:54,320
course, Yeah.
And not just for them, it could

740
00:37:54,320 --> 00:37:56,320
be third parties involved, they
could be children, other family

741
00:37:56,320 --> 00:37:59,000
members, that situation.
They could be there's a whole

742
00:37:59,000 --> 00:38:01,600
list of so we're in that we're
at the sharp end.

743
00:38:01,600 --> 00:38:04,800
We're we're there uncovering
exactly what's going on and

744
00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:07,360
reporting back the fact.
And we when we report, we can't

745
00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:09,760
hold back.
We can't say, well, he didn't

746
00:38:09,760 --> 00:38:13,400
touch her there or we didn't see
them kiss or we they didn't.

747
00:38:13,600 --> 00:38:16,680
We have to be straight up front.
And this is what's happened.

748
00:38:16,680 --> 00:38:20,800
And here's the proof.
So I want to say he could be she

749
00:38:20,800 --> 00:38:21,960
right.
So so we're clear.

750
00:38:22,120 --> 00:38:32,520
But so do clients say, yeah,
some are their gut instinct and

751
00:38:32,520 --> 00:38:33,920
they they were right with their
gut.

752
00:38:34,480 --> 00:38:37,960
And, and I suppose they they
are, maybe I don't have the word

753
00:38:37,960 --> 00:38:40,520
happy, but maybe satisfied that
they're.

754
00:38:40,520 --> 00:38:41,960
That they were right.
That they were right.

755
00:38:41,960 --> 00:38:46,160
The suspicions.
Were right yeah OK so so just

756
00:38:46,160 --> 00:38:49,240
let's let's remain we're we're
on the cheating topic so let's

757
00:38:49,240 --> 00:38:52,760
just stay here.
So probably a lot I I suspect a

758
00:38:52,760 --> 00:38:57,360
lot of the private individuals
that come to you want to know is

759
00:38:57,360 --> 00:39:01,600
my partner, you know husband
wife whatever it is cheating.

760
00:39:02,040 --> 00:39:05,960
Is that like a common thing?
Are a lot of people coming to

761
00:39:05,960 --> 00:39:08,280
you with that?
Yeah.

762
00:39:08,280 --> 00:39:12,080
I mean, yes, it when you say is
it common in the private sector,

763
00:39:12,120 --> 00:39:14,640
in the private sector, yeah,
that it's usually a breach of

764
00:39:14,640 --> 00:39:17,400
trust.
So you know, is this person that

765
00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:20,680
I trust doing something I
suspect they are OK, yes or no?

766
00:39:20,840 --> 00:39:23,760
So if you feel like suspicious,
like are you know, are they

767
00:39:23,760 --> 00:39:28,360
doing something like what do you
then do to investigate if they

768
00:39:28,360 --> 00:39:31,480
are in fact cheating without
showing all your cards?

769
00:39:31,960 --> 00:39:36,240
So before someone comes to us
and, and has the, you know, sort

770
00:39:36,240 --> 00:39:39,680
of motivation to instruct an
investigator, something must

771
00:39:39,680 --> 00:39:41,880
have happened.
And more than once, someone

772
00:39:41,880 --> 00:39:44,480
doesn't wake up one day and go,
yeah, let me follow my partner

773
00:39:44,480 --> 00:39:46,240
for a bit.
No, you know, there's, there's,

774
00:39:46,680 --> 00:39:48,920
there's all these identifiers.
Something doesn't add up.

775
00:39:48,920 --> 00:39:51,280
I've got a gut instinct.
There's a emotional issue.

776
00:39:51,280 --> 00:39:54,440
There's something's gone on and
then they come to us and then

777
00:39:54,680 --> 00:39:57,240
during that onboarding Phase, I
need to understand a little bit

778
00:39:57,240 --> 00:40:01,400
about the routine the and we are
some pretty straight questions

779
00:40:01,400 --> 00:40:04,360
just to uncover how we're going
to best support.

780
00:40:04,680 --> 00:40:06,280
You have to yeah, what you're
trying to.

781
00:40:06,520 --> 00:40:08,640
Yeah, you have to dig and then,
and then we will do what we do.

782
00:40:08,640 --> 00:40:10,560
You know, usually there's a
suspicion.

783
00:40:10,600 --> 00:40:15,200
I believe it's someone from this
circle, this club, Sports Club.

784
00:40:15,200 --> 00:40:16,720
They can't know.
Who it might be?

785
00:40:16,720 --> 00:40:19,360
Work staff person they've.
Seen something on Instagram or?

786
00:40:19,360 --> 00:40:21,960
Whatever, this person's always
liking his post, you know why

787
00:40:21,960 --> 00:40:22,760
we're at.
Work.

788
00:40:22,760 --> 00:40:24,440
It's normally at work or.
Yeah, why?

789
00:40:24,440 --> 00:40:25,920
Why?
Spending time together.

790
00:40:25,920 --> 00:40:27,360
Exactly.
Or going out for work drinks.

791
00:40:27,360 --> 00:40:28,880
What again?
I tell you you're a useful

792
00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:31,680
contact to have just in case.
I've just.

793
00:40:33,080 --> 00:40:34,680
Yeah, I told, I told my husband
on the way here.

794
00:40:34,680 --> 00:40:37,640
I was like I got my.
Watch yourself.

795
00:40:37,720 --> 00:40:40,680
There's trips abroad.
That's the other one.

796
00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:42,480
You'll never know if I'm
watching you.

797
00:40:44,040 --> 00:40:48,600
That's the emotion of black.
But it's good, you know, I mean,

798
00:40:48,800 --> 00:40:51,480
so people can use those services
if they suspect something.

799
00:40:51,480 --> 00:40:53,160
But then you could also have the
other side, which is what we've

800
00:40:53,200 --> 00:40:56,800
also touched on, the very
controlling, paranoid person who

801
00:40:56,800 --> 00:40:59,520
just wants to like, I want to
know your every move just in

802
00:40:59,520 --> 00:41:01,840
case because my pride couldn't
handle it if you're dead.

803
00:41:01,840 --> 00:41:03,600
She told me, oh, you might,
you're too attractive.

804
00:41:03,600 --> 00:41:05,520
You might do something or
someone might try with you like

805
00:41:05,520 --> 00:41:08,880
a paranoia.
You know you must get a lot of

806
00:41:08,880 --> 00:41:10,920
that too.
Your behaviour when you're not

807
00:41:10,920 --> 00:41:13,560
with me, you know that's.
Yeah, what do you do when you're

808
00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:15,360
not with me?
Yeah, how do you conduct

809
00:41:15,360 --> 00:41:18,600
yourself?
The other the other ones that

810
00:41:18,600 --> 00:41:20,640
we've had is pre and this is
certainly going to sound a

811
00:41:20,640 --> 00:41:23,480
little bit weird, but but not
it's not weird, it's just

812
00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:28,960
different premarital check.
So generally it's in different

813
00:41:28,960 --> 00:41:33,800
cultures overseas where someone
is is of a of a certain standing

814
00:41:33,800 --> 00:41:39,200
is going to marry someone She's
him, he her, whatever.

815
00:41:40,160 --> 00:41:44,280
And they just there's, there's a
bit that's not quite right and

816
00:41:44,280 --> 00:41:47,360
they just want to full check
just to make sure the partner

817
00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:53,960
I'm going to that's going to be
introduced into my family is of

818
00:41:53,960 --> 00:41:57,960
the right moral.
Everything, everything.

819
00:41:58,640 --> 00:42:00,920
Look, you know you should.
You should know that if you're

820
00:42:00,920 --> 00:42:03,280
going to marry someone anyway,
you shouldn't go to a third

821
00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:04,800
party profession.
Give you gonna say that?

822
00:42:04,920 --> 00:42:08,720
Yeah, an independent opinion,
yeah, but some do some some want

823
00:42:08,720 --> 00:42:10,880
that secondary there must maybe
their.

824
00:42:10,880 --> 00:42:13,160
Families do as well.
It's like a condition and.

825
00:42:13,320 --> 00:42:17,040
Like there's a bit of doubt.
It's a difficult one that that

826
00:42:17,040 --> 00:42:19,120
one because you kind of think,
well, I would think if I found

827
00:42:19,120 --> 00:42:22,000
out, for example, that
someone's, I would call it

828
00:42:22,000 --> 00:42:24,080
spying in that way because why
didn't you ask me what, you

829
00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:26,080
don't trust me?
And then it's like, that's a red

830
00:42:26,080 --> 00:42:27,960
flag.
Well, you're paranoid because

831
00:42:27,960 --> 00:42:31,080
you can't even get into a
relationship normally and you've

832
00:42:31,080 --> 00:42:33,200
got to start doing all this
stuff.

833
00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:36,120
Now, this is usually when
they're in a relationship and

834
00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:38,720
they're about to marry.
So there's the next big, massive

835
00:42:38,720 --> 00:42:40,280
step.
There's a commitment here

836
00:42:40,760 --> 00:42:43,080
generally linked to, you know,
being part of a family.

837
00:42:43,120 --> 00:42:45,200
There's assets.
Exactly right.

838
00:42:45,400 --> 00:42:46,880
It's money, all right.
We're going to move.

839
00:42:47,080 --> 00:42:49,080
We're going to move into, into
corporate.

840
00:42:49,080 --> 00:42:52,920
So it can, I mean, we, we spoke
about it.

841
00:42:52,920 --> 00:42:56,960
Companies do vet high profile
employees.

842
00:42:56,960 --> 00:42:58,800
They, they do, they're going to
hire someone, give them a

843
00:42:58,800 --> 00:43:00,880
massive salary.
They're going to check who they

844
00:43:00,920 --> 00:43:03,280
are and that that's common and
normal.

845
00:43:03,560 --> 00:43:05,720
Do they have to tell them, by
the way, as part of the

846
00:43:05,720 --> 00:43:08,320
recruitment process?
We're going to thoroughly check

847
00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:10,720
you.
So most companies do pre

848
00:43:10,720 --> 00:43:12,440
employment screening and it's
consented.

849
00:43:12,440 --> 00:43:15,680
So the employee, it's fully
especially if they're in any

850
00:43:15,680 --> 00:43:19,280
professional services like
finance, banking, law.

851
00:43:19,480 --> 00:43:21,280
Politics.
Politics.

852
00:43:21,280 --> 00:43:24,560
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
OK, so they do a lot of.

853
00:43:24,880 --> 00:43:29,560
So you you would have, and I
would recommend anyone, any

854
00:43:29,560 --> 00:43:33,160
company out there that's
employing staff and and these

855
00:43:33,160 --> 00:43:37,040
can be quite cost effective to
conduct a get a get a

856
00:43:37,040 --> 00:43:39,720
professional in to do the red
flag check the last thing you

857
00:43:39,720 --> 00:43:41,320
need, right.
Especially if you're if you're

858
00:43:41,320 --> 00:43:44,600
open and you're dealing with, I
don't know, you've got

859
00:43:44,760 --> 00:43:48,160
everyone's got a reputation and
you take on the wrong someone

860
00:43:48,160 --> 00:43:49,960
with a checkered past that you
didn't know about.

861
00:43:50,320 --> 00:43:54,560
Yeah, and a clever journalist
find something somewhere from

862
00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:57,600
wherever and puts it in.
How damaging is that to your

863
00:43:57,600 --> 00:43:58,800
brand?
Extremely damaging.

864
00:43:58,920 --> 00:44:00,560
But if you knew from the
beginning, you can take.

865
00:44:00,560 --> 00:44:03,480
Steps you think that they always
finding things on these people

866
00:44:03,480 --> 00:44:06,040
and then these big corporations
and some of their employees.

867
00:44:06,080 --> 00:44:07,680
You know, you know that.
White lies.

868
00:44:08,400 --> 00:44:09,920
White lies on the CV.
There's that.

869
00:44:09,920 --> 00:44:11,480
That white.
Lies on the CV, but then they

870
00:44:11,480 --> 00:44:12,800
also met.
Let's say they pass this to the

871
00:44:12,800 --> 00:44:15,440
CV is OK because they've done
the incredible things, but then

872
00:44:15,440 --> 00:44:18,200
they they just do sinister
things outside of work.

873
00:44:18,560 --> 00:44:20,760
Again, it needs to be
proportionate.

874
00:44:20,960 --> 00:44:25,560
So we do a thing called which
is, which is quite a relatively

875
00:44:25,560 --> 00:44:27,880
new tool called social media
check, right?

876
00:44:27,880 --> 00:44:30,960
And what it does is with
consent, it will screen.

877
00:44:31,240 --> 00:44:33,920
And I, I, I, I recommend
everyone does this on

878
00:44:33,920 --> 00:44:37,200
themselves, right?
It's screaming scream myself

879
00:44:37,200 --> 00:44:41,360
screen no, because movements
change over periods of time.

880
00:44:41,560 --> 00:44:44,800
So it will screen all of your
posts, all of your tweets, all

881
00:44:44,800 --> 00:44:46,720
of your likes, all of your
comments to see whether there's

882
00:44:46,720 --> 00:44:50,280
any defamatory, politically,
maybe incorrect, you know, you

883
00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:51,200
may have.
Check I need it.

884
00:44:51,600 --> 00:44:53,480
Thank you.
You may have liked something.

885
00:44:54,000 --> 00:44:55,480
By accident.
By accident, 10 years.

886
00:44:55,480 --> 00:44:58,600
No, no, you may like something
by accident 10 years ago that

887
00:44:58,600 --> 00:45:00,720
now is like, oh, you, we can't
talk about that now.

888
00:45:00,720 --> 00:45:02,800
We we can't talk, you know,
because of whatever can.

889
00:45:02,800 --> 00:45:05,200
You undo it.
Yes, and what this does, it's

890
00:45:05,200 --> 00:45:06,480
with consent.
It goes through, it gives you a

891
00:45:06,480 --> 00:45:07,880
whole report.
I mean, we've done all of our

892
00:45:07,880 --> 00:45:09,520
stuff and there was some
interesting.

893
00:45:09,520 --> 00:45:11,840
We found things.
Yeah, so we found some

894
00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:15,160
profanities, right.
So swear words and and, and I

895
00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:17,400
spoke to one of the chaps and I
was like, wow, that's quite a

896
00:45:17,400 --> 00:45:19,800
lot on there.
And what it was is.

897
00:45:20,480 --> 00:45:25,800
And we found some it was like,
not it was what was it termed

898
00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:27,840
hate type speech, Right?
Yeah.

899
00:45:28,480 --> 00:45:30,800
And when it when looked at it,
it was Ricky.

900
00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:32,920
Ricky Gervais is quite an
animal, right?

901
00:45:32,920 --> 00:45:36,400
Yes, that's right.
He loves animals, yes, and there

902
00:45:36,400 --> 00:45:39,280
was some of his posts had swear
words in there against.

903
00:45:39,280 --> 00:45:41,280
They were like, yeah.
Activists and whatever else.

904
00:45:41,520 --> 00:45:44,840
And those posts were liked.
So this, this tool flagged all

905
00:45:44,840 --> 00:45:47,160
of those up.
So, so which is good, right?

906
00:45:47,160 --> 00:45:50,280
So if you're going for a, if
you're in the employment market

907
00:45:50,280 --> 00:45:52,280
and you're looking for a new
job, I'll definitely screen

908
00:45:52,280 --> 00:45:53,520
because your employer's going to
screen you.

909
00:45:53,520 --> 00:45:56,320
So you you may as well screen
yourself just to make sure

910
00:45:56,320 --> 00:45:57,920
you're clean and if if you're
not clean.

911
00:45:57,920 --> 00:45:59,920
It's like a credit check, but
different on another level.

912
00:46:00,280 --> 00:46:03,600
This is a fascinating thing.
OK, everyone's got to do this

913
00:46:03,920 --> 00:46:04,840
social.
Media check.

914
00:46:04,840 --> 00:46:07,760
Social media check and just
check your footprint and don't

915
00:46:07,760 --> 00:46:09,080
do anything crazy in the 1st
place.

916
00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:13,120
I was going to ask you about
certain industries that are more

917
00:46:13,120 --> 00:46:15,480
likely to do this investigative
work, but I think it's pretty

918
00:46:15,480 --> 00:46:16,680
clear.
I think you know, the high

919
00:46:16,680 --> 00:46:19,960
profile individuals, the the
high profile decision makers,

920
00:46:20,320 --> 00:46:21,480
that sort of thing, probably
not.

921
00:46:21,480 --> 00:46:23,880
Your regular employer is not
going to really care to that

922
00:46:23,880 --> 00:46:25,520
extent.
What with the pre employment?

923
00:46:25,840 --> 00:46:27,600
Yeah, with just general checking
up on you.

924
00:46:27,640 --> 00:46:33,040
Just general background even
even even anyone who's employing

925
00:46:33,040 --> 00:46:35,360
anyone because the pre
employment check is is

926
00:46:35,360 --> 00:46:38,000
relatively cheap quick process
to do so even anyone who's

927
00:46:38,000 --> 00:46:40,200
employing anyone should have
that as their onboarding.

928
00:46:40,960 --> 00:46:42,000
You need to check who's working
for.

929
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:44,520
You so this isn't a sort of
crossing the line grey area.

930
00:46:44,520 --> 00:46:47,640
This is like a recommended like
you are.

931
00:46:47,760 --> 00:46:50,000
Yes, there's your CV and then
there's like you're saying,

932
00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:51,640
there's all the stuff that you'd
be doing online.

933
00:46:51,640 --> 00:46:52,840
We need to know what you're
doing online.

934
00:46:54,360 --> 00:46:58,000
The online is optional, I would
say, depending on the industry

935
00:46:58,000 --> 00:46:59,800
you're in, right.
You know, you don't need to go

936
00:46:59,800 --> 00:47:03,560
that deep, but anything in terms
of checking the person's got the

937
00:47:03,600 --> 00:47:07,800
right to work in the UK has you
know, yeah, you would need to do

938
00:47:07,800 --> 00:47:09,520
it.
And again, those those pre

939
00:47:09,520 --> 00:47:11,800
employment checks are
proportionate and scale up to

940
00:47:11,880 --> 00:47:13,480
depending on what type of
industry you're in.

941
00:47:13,480 --> 00:47:15,760
Depending on what you're doing,
yeah.

942
00:47:15,920 --> 00:47:17,520
OK.
Because it's like the politics

943
00:47:17,520 --> 00:47:20,840
side and the business side,
those two collide and that's

944
00:47:20,840 --> 00:47:22,560
just a ginormous requirement.
I.

945
00:47:22,720 --> 00:47:25,760
Mean those are, you know, very
senior people in the public eye

946
00:47:25,760 --> 00:47:29,480
so that you know there's their
whole careers are scrutinized

947
00:47:29,520 --> 00:47:30,640
every.
Single thing.

948
00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:33,880
Word, you know, they have
communication teams, media

949
00:47:33,880 --> 00:47:35,720
teams, advisory teams, strategic
teams.

950
00:47:35,720 --> 00:47:38,760
You know, there's it's, it's not
them as a one individual.

951
00:47:38,760 --> 00:47:41,440
There's a whole team that
support.

952
00:47:41,720 --> 00:47:43,680
Yeah, they've got PR teams, of
course.

953
00:47:44,120 --> 00:47:45,960
They do.
But then on the other side of

954
00:47:45,960 --> 00:47:48,480
that, you've got other teams,
individuals and whatever else,

955
00:47:48,480 --> 00:47:51,520
even members of the public
looking at every tiny little

956
00:47:51,520 --> 00:47:54,560
thing that anyone in the public
domain or in the public eye,

957
00:47:54,560 --> 00:47:59,120
sorry, does and has an open
platform, a free open platform,

958
00:47:59,120 --> 00:48:03,600
social media channels to post,
tweet, comment, describe what

959
00:48:03,600 --> 00:48:06,280
they've seen.
So you could say you saw a

960
00:48:06,360 --> 00:48:10,800
politician say X on television
and you would, we could do, do

961
00:48:10,800 --> 00:48:12,360
it now.
You could go onto your social

962
00:48:12,360 --> 00:48:14,040
media account and say, I just
saw he said that.

963
00:48:14,040 --> 00:48:17,160
What do you guys think this was?
You know, and you can create a

964
00:48:17,160 --> 00:48:20,080
narrative or a movement on
something that you've just seen

965
00:48:20,200 --> 00:48:24,760
on online on television.
So it's a really, really weird

966
00:48:24,760 --> 00:48:26,840
world we live in now.
Yeah.

967
00:48:27,960 --> 00:48:31,880
I mean, I think private
individuals don't really, well,

968
00:48:32,200 --> 00:48:35,720
even even me just thinking about
it, we don't really give

969
00:48:35,720 --> 00:48:39,840
ourselves enough protection in
that way to do our own screening

970
00:48:40,320 --> 00:48:42,240
and to just, you know, because
because like you're saying,

971
00:48:42,240 --> 00:48:46,280
these big presidents and
politicians, whoever, these

972
00:48:46,280 --> 00:48:49,240
guys, big corporates, they've
got teams that look out for

973
00:48:49,240 --> 00:48:51,680
them, that tell them what to
say, how to say it, you know,

974
00:48:51,680 --> 00:48:53,360
that protect them if something
does go wrong.

975
00:48:53,360 --> 00:48:56,000
Reputation management.
It's like an entire office if

976
00:48:56,000 --> 00:48:58,680
office buildings and people just
working to protect their

977
00:48:58,680 --> 00:49:02,400
reputation, correct online and
offline, helping them, guiding

978
00:49:02,400 --> 00:49:04,040
them, what you should say, what
you shouldn't say, how you

979
00:49:04,040 --> 00:49:05,480
should behave, sit, talk,
everything.

980
00:49:05,680 --> 00:49:07,840
And then you've got everyone
else is kind of left.

981
00:49:07,840 --> 00:49:11,440
It's almost like naked and
you've got to cope and know how

982
00:49:11,440 --> 00:49:14,480
to survive.
And but with these platforms

983
00:49:14,480 --> 00:49:18,120
that can also come in and, you
know, scrutinize you, attack

984
00:49:18,120 --> 00:49:23,080
you, you know, and also being on
reality TV, you know, once you

985
00:49:23,080 --> 00:49:27,240
get a platform, then already
you're in that realm, but you

986
00:49:27,240 --> 00:49:31,000
might not have the protection
complete skills or whatever it

987
00:49:31,000 --> 00:49:33,920
is, it's quite rough.
Yeah, you do what you think's

988
00:49:33,920 --> 00:49:38,200
right.
But then in defence to that,

989
00:49:38,320 --> 00:49:42,880
usually what's happening now is
today's news is is not relevant

990
00:49:42,880 --> 00:49:44,200
tomorrow because there's
something else and there's

991
00:49:44,200 --> 00:49:45,440
something else and there's so
much out there.

992
00:49:45,440 --> 00:49:49,440
So unless you're being targeted
so that.

993
00:49:49,480 --> 00:49:50,560
Unless you're being targeted.
Unless.

994
00:49:50,560 --> 00:49:53,320
You're being targeted by a group
who will continue to push a

995
00:49:53,360 --> 00:49:55,840
narrative.
So, and this is what happens at

996
00:49:55,880 --> 00:49:57,720
the top end.
Look at what's going on

997
00:49:57,720 --> 00:50:01,400
globally, you know.
So I think for the individual,

998
00:50:01,400 --> 00:50:03,600
whilst there isn't that much
protection in place and it is a

999
00:50:03,600 --> 00:50:06,760
little bit of self learning
because you can, you know, I

1000
00:50:06,760 --> 00:50:10,720
think you as you evolve in the
public eye from the ground up,

1001
00:50:10,760 --> 00:50:13,600
you will make mistakes and you
learn the hard way, right?

1002
00:50:13,640 --> 00:50:19,960
You do, you do so, and it takes
a certain type of individual to

1003
00:50:19,960 --> 00:50:23,680
absorb what's going on and
either let it filter through to

1004
00:50:23,680 --> 00:50:26,720
you or not or block, you know,
just distance yourself from it.

1005
00:50:26,720 --> 00:50:29,360
But if that's the decision and
journey you're taking, you need

1006
00:50:29,360 --> 00:50:32,640
to be aware of the risks.
Yeah, yeah.

1007
00:50:32,640 --> 00:50:36,040
And and that definitely there
are definitely risk and there's

1008
00:50:36,040 --> 00:50:40,400
also massive benefits.
So yes, we spoke about

1009
00:50:40,400 --> 00:50:42,360
suppressing damaging
information.

1010
00:50:43,480 --> 00:50:46,360
I mean, if you want to find out
if someone's sort of like spying

1011
00:50:46,360 --> 00:50:49,000
on you, whatever, you can hire
someone to check, like someone

1012
00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:51,360
doing that but also suppressing
information.

1013
00:50:51,360 --> 00:50:54,040
So have you been asked to sort
of, they don't really

1014
00:50:54,040 --> 00:50:57,960
investigate here, but just don't
let this thing come out about me

1015
00:50:57,960 --> 00:51:00,400
or my company or whatever.
That's more you've been done to

1016
00:51:00,400 --> 00:51:02,600
do.
That that's more PR, that's more

1017
00:51:02,600 --> 00:51:07,680
PR strategy and pushing say
comments that have been posted

1018
00:51:07,680 --> 00:51:11,480
out there, you know, down the
line in Google that's we're,

1019
00:51:11,520 --> 00:51:13,800
we're investigators, we, we
uncover, we don't.

1020
00:51:14,520 --> 00:51:16,760
So you would uncover, let's say
that because let's just say a

1021
00:51:16,760 --> 00:51:22,400
company, something's happened
and your client wants to, they

1022
00:51:22,400 --> 00:51:24,640
will have the PR team to
obviously damage control, let's

1023
00:51:24,640 --> 00:51:27,040
say that does come out.
But really we don't want it to

1024
00:51:27,040 --> 00:51:29,520
come out.
So we want to investigate what's

1025
00:51:29,520 --> 00:51:31,680
going on there on this
particular subject.

1026
00:51:31,720 --> 00:51:35,840
Is it coming out, who spoke, who
said what, who's released

1027
00:51:36,200 --> 00:51:39,480
documents, anything like that?
Yeah, we've worked with PR teams

1028
00:51:39,480 --> 00:51:41,680
before.
So there there could be a

1029
00:51:41,680 --> 00:51:44,320
something about to break or
there's been an issue or there's

1030
00:51:44,320 --> 00:51:46,840
been a, there's a leak.
It's uncovering the leak.

1031
00:51:46,840 --> 00:51:49,360
And who's the internal insider
threat, which is the mole.

1032
00:51:50,000 --> 00:51:52,160
Who's the mole, right, Yeah.
Who's the insider threat?

1033
00:51:52,160 --> 00:51:53,720
And there are a few ways to
tackle that.

1034
00:51:53,920 --> 00:51:55,000
OK.
So how would you tackle it?

1035
00:51:55,080 --> 00:51:57,120
I knew you were going to ask.
Yeah, go on.

1036
00:51:57,320 --> 00:51:58,200
So how did?
You find the mole.

1037
00:51:58,200 --> 00:52:03,880
So there usually is some type of
intelligence or lead that we

1038
00:52:03,880 --> 00:52:07,080
need to go through from and it's
usually what what type of

1039
00:52:07,080 --> 00:52:09,000
information is coming out?
Where's it being leaked?

1040
00:52:09,000 --> 00:52:11,520
So they we may need to check the
internal systems.

1041
00:52:11,520 --> 00:52:15,200
They could be emails or
communications between what's

1042
00:52:15,200 --> 00:52:17,600
going on in that particular
office and someone externally.

1043
00:52:18,000 --> 00:52:21,160
They could be a disgruntled
employee that's left that's

1044
00:52:21,680 --> 00:52:24,960
recently, but still very good
friends with someone that works

1045
00:52:25,080 --> 00:52:29,440
for the office and there's some
sharing of data or that or, or

1046
00:52:29,440 --> 00:52:33,120
or a narrative that I don't
know, was started and then

1047
00:52:33,120 --> 00:52:35,600
stopped there.
There's usually some pinch

1048
00:52:35,600 --> 00:52:38,000
points that we would look at as
leads.

1049
00:52:38,280 --> 00:52:42,520
That gives us something.
If there isn't, which generally

1050
00:52:42,520 --> 00:52:44,760
there is.
But if there isn't, then we

1051
00:52:44,760 --> 00:52:46,680
would look at what type of
narratives coming out.

1052
00:52:46,680 --> 00:52:49,920
What is it, you know, is there
emails being sent to someone or

1053
00:52:49,920 --> 00:52:52,840
you know who?
What journalist has received

1054
00:52:52,840 --> 00:52:57,200
this breaking story and how?
And then the journalist usually

1055
00:52:57,200 --> 00:53:00,200
would ask the client to say,
right, we've received this, can

1056
00:53:00,200 --> 00:53:02,560
you comment on X?
And there, that's where their PR

1057
00:53:02,560 --> 00:53:06,360
team would speak to the client
and advise them on how to

1058
00:53:06,360 --> 00:53:10,120
respond to a journalist.
We would, if possible, ask for

1059
00:53:10,120 --> 00:53:13,080
the request of what they've been
sent and seeing whether we could

1060
00:53:13,080 --> 00:53:16,880
find any information there that
can try and connect the dots

1061
00:53:16,880 --> 00:53:20,040
backwards.
But yeah, so connecting dots

1062
00:53:20,040 --> 00:53:22,760
there.
Because I just thought back to a

1063
00:53:22,760 --> 00:53:26,360
story actually that my husband
told me about this is way before

1064
00:53:26,360 --> 00:53:33,040
he met me, but about an
obsessive women that because in

1065
00:53:33,040 --> 00:53:36,720
those days used to be a bit of
a, you know, go out lad,

1066
00:53:36,720 --> 00:53:38,800
whatever, which is fairly.
You're a young man, you know,

1067
00:53:38,840 --> 00:53:41,040
you, you're not married.
You can, you know, just live

1068
00:53:41,040 --> 00:53:43,200
your life, please get it off
your system.

1069
00:53:44,280 --> 00:53:46,880
And, you know, and and he met
this this woman who became

1070
00:53:47,000 --> 00:53:50,240
obsessive about him.
And initially it was quite nice.

1071
00:53:50,240 --> 00:53:52,720
All you're obsessed with me.
Give me all this like attention.

1072
00:53:53,120 --> 00:53:57,200
But then it's a bit like, OK,
just, you know, and and he tried

1073
00:53:57,200 --> 00:53:59,880
to go off and, and live his life
and meet someone else.

1074
00:53:59,880 --> 00:54:01,720
And obviously she wasn't having
any of it.

1075
00:54:02,200 --> 00:54:05,400
So she would do things like the
sort of the red flag symbols are

1076
00:54:05,400 --> 00:54:09,120
already there.
Like she would plant a hair of

1077
00:54:09,120 --> 00:54:12,720
hers, you know, on a bed sheet
in case and someone else might

1078
00:54:13,240 --> 00:54:15,360
go in one day.
And it started with those red

1079
00:54:15,360 --> 00:54:17,400
flags, you know, in case another
woman came in and go, oh, whose

1080
00:54:17,400 --> 00:54:19,200
hair is that?
What this is, you know,

1081
00:54:19,560 --> 00:54:21,880
brunette's hair and I'm blonde,
whatever, you know, those sort

1082
00:54:21,880 --> 00:54:24,120
of things.
It's like so obvious, but she

1083
00:54:24,120 --> 00:54:26,520
would start doing it, but then
it went on to more serious

1084
00:54:26,520 --> 00:54:27,640
things.
Then there was things like

1085
00:54:28,200 --> 00:54:32,920
sending an e-mail, you know, to,
to to several people within the

1086
00:54:32,920 --> 00:54:35,520
company saying, oh, he did this
and he's like that.

1087
00:54:35,520 --> 00:54:37,800
And then but like, you know, you
know, stepping it up.

1088
00:54:37,800 --> 00:54:40,640
So you've got those sort of
things, which again, private

1089
00:54:40,640 --> 00:54:42,800
individuals have to to deal
with.

1090
00:54:42,880 --> 00:54:45,720
And of course politicians deal
with on to the highest level,

1091
00:54:45,920 --> 00:54:48,920
but it's the same thing.
It's basically the same thing.

1092
00:54:48,920 --> 00:54:52,720
It's people trying to plant dirt
on you or ruin your reputation

1093
00:54:52,720 --> 00:54:55,400
or whatever, in which case it
would be beneficial.

1094
00:54:55,400 --> 00:54:57,760
I mean, you wouldn't hire
necessarily a private

1095
00:54:57,800 --> 00:55:01,440
international investigator Pi to
deal with that, but.

1096
00:55:02,000 --> 00:55:03,960
You'd be surprised.
To it would be nice to.

1097
00:55:03,960 --> 00:55:05,760
You'd be surprised.
Sinister like that.

1098
00:55:05,800 --> 00:55:07,400
Yeah, we've, we've done several
cases like.

1099
00:55:07,400 --> 00:55:11,280
That all right, OK.
Where that is borderline

1100
00:55:11,280 --> 00:55:15,000
harassment totally and it
depends on exactly that.

1101
00:55:15,000 --> 00:55:18,120
So we would document what's out
there and there's there are

1102
00:55:18,120 --> 00:55:21,360
legal remedies for that.
There are there is a legal cease

1103
00:55:21,360 --> 00:55:23,880
and desist because that's you're
breaking the law there.

1104
00:55:23,880 --> 00:55:27,880
So if you continue to harass,
spread misinformation,

1105
00:55:27,880 --> 00:55:30,440
communicate with third parties,
damage someone's reputation,

1106
00:55:30,440 --> 00:55:31,840
defamation, there's.
Jealousy.

1107
00:55:32,040 --> 00:55:33,880
Yeah.
For whatever reason, it could be

1108
00:55:33,880 --> 00:55:36,120
jealousy, it could be that she,
she can't move on.

1109
00:55:36,120 --> 00:55:40,280
She she she predicted this life
with your husband years ago.

1110
00:55:40,400 --> 00:55:43,520
Immature, well, whatever you
want to call it, you know, just

1111
00:55:43,520 --> 00:55:45,760
inability to take like it's no,
it's a no.

1112
00:55:45,880 --> 00:55:47,360
I mean, get a cat.
Cats will teach you about

1113
00:55:47,360 --> 00:55:50,320
rejection.
Right there you go, it's OK, but

1114
00:55:50,360 --> 00:55:54,240
but maybe someone like that went
once it goes from this keyboard

1115
00:55:54,240 --> 00:55:57,480
warrior scenario to a legal
letter, you've ceased and desist

1116
00:55:57,480 --> 00:55:59,760
further communication or XYZ is
going to happen.

1117
00:56:00,080 --> 00:56:01,920
It sometimes is a wake up call.
So you know what?

1118
00:56:01,920 --> 00:56:04,000
I really didn't realise that I
was doing what I was doing.

1119
00:56:04,480 --> 00:56:07,040
I've got to step away.
Or if they're completely, you

1120
00:56:07,040 --> 00:56:11,200
know, out there and crazy and
want to pursue this, then you go

1121
00:56:11,760 --> 00:56:15,840
line by line with what what
options are available to get

1122
00:56:15,840 --> 00:56:19,160
this individual to stop.
OK, talk about consequences,

1123
00:56:20,280 --> 00:56:23,640
consequences of, of actions.
So has has there ever been a

1124
00:56:23,640 --> 00:56:28,760
case that made you rethink, you
know, your career, that made you

1125
00:56:28,760 --> 00:56:32,240
think about ethics, that that
sort of touched you on that

1126
00:56:32,240 --> 00:56:35,040
level where you've been
encountered with something

1127
00:56:35,040 --> 00:56:41,240
that's made you go?
Anything to do with children, to

1128
00:56:41,240 --> 00:56:44,000
be honest with you.
And I'm talking about either

1129
00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:47,280
locating one that's been
abducted legally.

1130
00:56:47,400 --> 00:56:49,640
When I say no, it's not.
Legally, yeah, no, but.

1131
00:56:50,440 --> 00:56:52,520
Yeah, but and it's usually.
Literally abducted, Yeah.

1132
00:56:52,520 --> 00:56:55,960
Taken usually in family
situations where you have, I

1133
00:56:55,960 --> 00:57:02,000
don't know, one the, the, the
relationship's broken down and

1134
00:57:02,280 --> 00:57:04,960
one is from a different
jurisdiction and one is from a

1135
00:57:04,960 --> 00:57:07,400
different jurisdiction and one
wants to take the kids and

1136
00:57:07,400 --> 00:57:08,960
there's a legal dispute and
battle.

1137
00:57:08,960 --> 00:57:12,600
And one just says we're off and
we're, we're going to wherever

1138
00:57:12,600 --> 00:57:13,720
and you'll never going to find
me.

1139
00:57:13,720 --> 00:57:16,960
And that's it.
It's done so there.

1140
00:57:17,080 --> 00:57:20,000
And that's there's an issue in
court going on and there's,

1141
00:57:20,200 --> 00:57:22,640
you're dealing with maybe
jurisdictions that are not as

1142
00:57:23,520 --> 00:57:26,800
westernised in terms of legal
processes and you've got one

1143
00:57:26,800 --> 00:57:30,040
parent with custody.
Legally, that's not being Those

1144
00:57:30,040 --> 00:57:31,440
are tough cases.
Horrible.

1145
00:57:31,520 --> 00:57:33,040
And then you've got the little
person of.

1146
00:57:33,120 --> 00:57:36,280
Course you have so those cases.
And you're a dad, and that's

1147
00:57:36,280 --> 00:57:38,880
horrible.
Anything like that is can be

1148
00:57:39,720 --> 00:57:43,560
quite challenging in terms of
we've got to do the right thing.

1149
00:57:43,560 --> 00:57:46,320
The right thing for the.
Right reasons under the right

1150
00:57:46,320 --> 00:57:47,880
circumstances.
And the right thing is, the

1151
00:57:47,880 --> 00:57:50,040
right right thing for one person
is not the right thing for the

1152
00:57:50,040 --> 00:57:50,840
other.
Completely.

1153
00:57:50,920 --> 00:57:54,640
And we are, we're not the, we're
not the decision maker, right?

1154
00:57:54,640 --> 00:58:00,320
We are, we are there to provide
the information to maybe the

1155
00:58:00,320 --> 00:58:02,560
legal teams or the courts to
say, well, look, that's this is

1156
00:58:02,560 --> 00:58:04,680
actually where they are.
And now we'll deal with local

1157
00:58:04,680 --> 00:58:07,440
authorities to try and recover
and whatever else.

1158
00:58:07,440 --> 00:58:14,520
So anything like that and
anything where the let's say

1159
00:58:14,520 --> 00:58:17,240
there's a a bit, I mean, I've
spoken about it.

1160
00:58:17,320 --> 00:58:21,880
I, I worked on a case God, man
must have been about 10 years

1161
00:58:21,880 --> 00:58:27,040
ago where the family were from
Canada and the daughter was 18.

1162
00:58:27,040 --> 00:58:31,120
She met a boy online through one
of these platforms, who knows,

1163
00:58:31,560 --> 00:58:35,000
and they started to communicate.
He was in the UK.

1164
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:42,240
She'd never been outside Canada.
She wasn't in any education, she

1165
00:58:42,240 --> 00:58:45,000
was at a loose end, an 18 year
old and living her life and

1166
00:58:45,000 --> 00:58:47,360
whatever else.
Family were not super wealthy

1167
00:58:47,360 --> 00:58:49,800
but they were OK.
They were doing well, mum and

1168
00:58:49,800 --> 00:58:53,000
dad, lovely people.
She just booked a plane ticket

1169
00:58:53,040 --> 00:58:54,600
he said he booked he wanted to
see her.

1170
00:58:54,600 --> 00:58:56,800
They had this online
relationship for about 6 months

1171
00:58:57,320 --> 00:59:01,280
where they would just chat via a
platform which is not around

1172
00:59:01,280 --> 00:59:04,120
anymore.
This was just as WhatsApp

1173
00:59:04,600 --> 00:59:09,040
launched and she ended up
deciding to come to the UK by

1174
00:59:09,040 --> 00:59:15,320
herself, never travelled alone.
And when she got to the UK, she

1175
00:59:15,880 --> 00:59:18,520
she said to her dad, it's OK,
he's booked me in a hotel.

1176
00:59:18,800 --> 00:59:22,560
Here's the hotel booking.
She came to the UK, her phone

1177
00:59:22,560 --> 00:59:25,000
wouldn't work in the UK, right?
So the mom and dad couldn't

1178
00:59:25,000 --> 00:59:27,200
contact her.
They had no communication.

1179
00:59:27,640 --> 00:59:30,160
They came to us.
They were really worried, yes,

1180
00:59:31,400 --> 00:59:33,440
she's 18, so she's got the
right, she's an adult, she's got

1181
00:59:33,440 --> 00:59:37,400
the right to her own privacy.
So I thought I'll tell you what

1182
00:59:37,400 --> 00:59:42,000
we'll do to the mum and dad.
Let me just send a couple of

1183
00:59:42,000 --> 00:59:44,120
investigators to sniff around
the hotel just to make sure

1184
00:59:44,120 --> 00:59:47,520
she's checked in and safe and
like an alive and well check got

1185
00:59:47,520 --> 00:59:52,040
to the hotel and the booking was
cancelled and she no sign of

1186
00:59:52,040 --> 00:59:53,520
her, no sign of her.
She didn't check in.

1187
00:59:53,520 --> 00:59:55,520
So you could imagine now.
OK, Yeah.

1188
00:59:55,600 --> 00:59:56,600
What's going on?
Right.

1189
00:59:57,080 --> 00:59:58,920
As a parent, I would be losing
my mind.

1190
00:59:59,000 --> 01:00:01,200
OK, right.
You're on a flight to London

1191
01:00:01,200 --> 01:00:02,960
right from.
Canada immediately.

1192
01:00:03,080 --> 01:00:05,400
Immediately.
So, but where'd you go, right?

1193
01:00:05,480 --> 01:00:08,120
No idea where she is.
Her phone wasn't working because

1194
01:00:08,120 --> 01:00:11,360
it's an international phone and
back then and all of the sort of

1195
01:00:11,360 --> 01:00:15,840
basic things that we take for
granted, the mum and dad, I, I

1196
01:00:15,960 --> 01:00:18,400
long conversations with both of
them to understand because I

1197
01:00:18,400 --> 01:00:21,080
needed to understand what
happened before.

1198
01:00:21,600 --> 01:00:25,200
And you know, there was that
teenage breakdown chat, you

1199
01:00:25,200 --> 01:00:28,120
know, that we've got teenagers,
we've all been through there,

1200
01:00:29,280 --> 01:00:33,880
although minor, past teenagers
except for one, but that they

1201
01:00:33,880 --> 01:00:36,720
had that she was rebelling a
little bit and she wanted to be

1202
01:00:36,720 --> 01:00:40,400
her own person and dependent.
And I, I know what I'm doing and

1203
01:00:40,400 --> 01:00:42,640
I don't.
And she just got up and left and

1204
01:00:42,640 --> 01:00:45,000
she met this guy and he said all
the right things and any.

1205
01:00:45,320 --> 01:00:48,600
So we, we, we actually mounted
a, a full on investigation to

1206
01:00:48,600 --> 01:00:50,520
try and we'll award for her
safety then, right because.

1207
01:00:50,760 --> 01:00:52,120
She's disappeared.
She's disappeared.

1208
01:00:52,120 --> 01:00:53,720
So we had the authorities
involved.

1209
01:00:55,520 --> 01:00:58,960
Gosh.
And in the end, we, we, we

1210
01:00:58,960 --> 01:01:00,640
tracked the guy because he
cancelled.

1211
01:01:00,640 --> 01:01:02,160
He made the booking and then
cancelled it.

1212
01:01:02,160 --> 01:01:04,320
And through the booking that he
made, the hotel were quite

1213
01:01:04,400 --> 01:01:06,640
helpful because we were like,
look, it's an 18 year old from a

1214
01:01:06,640 --> 01:01:08,200
different country.
There's da da, da da.

1215
01:01:08,560 --> 01:01:13,360
Anyway, so we ended up
connecting some and found that

1216
01:01:13,640 --> 01:01:20,320
he was part of this, what you
call them like movement of like

1217
01:01:20,520 --> 01:01:25,320
not is it an anarchist?
They're in this disused flat or

1218
01:01:25,320 --> 01:01:27,440
with all sort of graffiti
sprayed on the wall.

1219
01:01:27,440 --> 01:01:30,160
Just like, you know, I don't
have to.

1220
01:01:30,320 --> 01:01:32,600
It's like a group.
It's not a gang.

1221
01:01:32,600 --> 01:01:37,880
It was like a group of three
spirits three, Yeah.

1222
01:01:38,280 --> 01:01:43,600
And she got, yeah, got mixed up
in that in a squatting type

1223
01:01:43,640 --> 01:01:45,440
facility.
Yeah, not good.

1224
01:01:45,840 --> 01:01:48,040
We found all of that.
We've got the the authorities

1225
01:01:48,040 --> 01:01:53,440
involved and told the father, I
mean, he was like, you know, I

1226
01:01:53,440 --> 01:01:56,560
can't believe you found her.
She OK, So yes, she's fine.

1227
01:01:56,560 --> 01:02:01,720
We've got her brilliant.
Can you get anyway, So in the

1228
01:02:01,720 --> 01:02:06,120
end we got her repatriated back.
She she was actually happy to go

1229
01:02:06,120 --> 01:02:09,440
home because she got involved in
this situation far too deep.

1230
01:02:09,600 --> 01:02:11,120
Yes, yes.
And didn't see her way out.

1231
01:02:11,120 --> 01:02:12,720
She got it.
She was like, this wasn't what I

1232
01:02:12,720 --> 01:02:14,840
was promised, but where am I
going to go now?

1233
01:02:14,920 --> 01:02:16,000
There's all drinks and it
wasn't.

1234
01:02:16,000 --> 01:02:18,040
Involved.
Yeah, Speaking to her parents.

1235
01:02:18,560 --> 01:02:19,920
Exactly.
So there was a breakdown.

1236
01:02:19,920 --> 01:02:21,280
She tried to be this
independent.

1237
01:02:21,280 --> 01:02:23,400
So we went for a whole emotion.
You talked about emotion.

1238
01:02:23,400 --> 01:02:24,280
That's a whole.
Emotion.

1239
01:02:24,280 --> 01:02:25,880
Very emotion.
And then about.

1240
01:02:25,880 --> 01:02:28,400
I don't know, six months later
the dad sent me a picture of

1241
01:02:28,400 --> 01:02:30,720
their family all together.
So nice, but.

1242
01:02:30,920 --> 01:02:32,880
Saved her life potentially,
because who knows what she's

1243
01:02:32,880 --> 01:02:34,520
doing in that hippie.
Well, luckily.

1244
01:02:34,520 --> 01:02:36,000
Well, that's the month.
I think it's the mother and

1245
01:02:36,000 --> 01:02:38,840
father that saved her Life.
OK, because they took action and

1246
01:02:38,840 --> 01:02:40,320
yes, contacted.
Us.

1247
01:02:40,320 --> 01:02:42,520
Oh, it's trying to.
Do so. 100%.

1248
01:02:42,520 --> 01:02:44,040
What you know, they went to the
police, they went to the

1249
01:02:44,040 --> 01:02:46,680
Canadian police, they've done
all that they did locally, but

1250
01:02:46,680 --> 01:02:48,480
then they'd come in at loose
end.

1251
01:02:48,480 --> 01:02:52,160
So anyway.
Mike is Mike and Conflict

1252
01:02:52,160 --> 01:02:56,760
International team useful,
useful contact if you ever land

1253
01:02:56,760 --> 01:02:59,480
up in hot water like that.
But obviously it must have a

1254
01:02:59,480 --> 01:03:02,520
mental toll on yourself.
You know you're a dad, so how do

1255
01:03:02,520 --> 01:03:04,480
you handle that?
How does your team handle it?

1256
01:03:04,480 --> 01:03:07,320
How do you tell them to sort of
separate work from?

1257
01:03:07,560 --> 01:03:10,280
This really tough sometimes and
it depends on what people are

1258
01:03:10,280 --> 01:03:11,960
going through.
But you know, you say we're all

1259
01:03:11,960 --> 01:03:16,840
human and you know, you try and
block out what's going on

1260
01:03:16,840 --> 01:03:22,040
through someone's world, however
you, you are, they're confident

1261
01:03:22,120 --> 01:03:25,360
at their most low time.
So for me, that's why my phone,

1262
01:03:25,360 --> 01:03:26,960
my job isn't 9:00 to 5:00 Monday
to Friday.

1263
01:03:26,960 --> 01:03:29,480
I answer my phone all the time.
I mean, it rang 3:00 in the

1264
01:03:29,480 --> 01:03:31,480
morning last night.
I was like, and it's a client

1265
01:03:31,480 --> 01:03:35,240
because I put, I put the alerts
on for clients and family only.

1266
01:03:35,240 --> 01:03:36,760
So anyone else that calls it
goes to a thing.

1267
01:03:36,760 --> 01:03:38,520
I'll see your clients on the
level of your family.

1268
01:03:38,520 --> 01:03:41,200
If I've got a live case, then
yeah, yeah, yeah.

1269
01:03:41,200 --> 01:03:43,960
Because then, and you know, it's
incredible, they're going

1270
01:03:43,960 --> 01:03:46,760
through stuff that they've
probably not discussed with the

1271
01:03:46,760 --> 01:03:48,080
people closest.
To them.

1272
01:03:48,400 --> 01:03:50,960
Yeah, and you know, you know
that information about their

1273
01:03:50,960 --> 01:03:53,840
personal life that no one else
probably knows in their circle,

1274
01:03:54,000 --> 01:03:55,840
so.
I mean, I mean seriously, do you

1275
01:03:55,840 --> 01:03:57,920
like do yoga?
Like, what do you do to like,

1276
01:03:58,240 --> 01:03:59,160
what do you, what do I do?
I do.

1277
01:03:59,160 --> 01:04:00,120
Triathlons.
I run.

1278
01:04:00,120 --> 01:04:02,440
I swim and I run.
Yeah, I run and bike.

1279
01:04:02,440 --> 01:04:04,400
Yeah, that's There you go.
That's what I do.

1280
01:04:04,400 --> 01:04:06,320
Sweat out there, you sweat it
out.

1281
01:04:06,320 --> 01:04:08,560
Punish myself.
Punish yourself, that's the only

1282
01:04:08,560 --> 01:04:10,760
way you've got to do that
because otherwise you go crazy.

1283
01:04:10,800 --> 01:04:12,840
Exactly.
You will literally get too

1284
01:04:12,840 --> 01:04:14,960
absorbed, especially if they're
calling you at 3:00.

1285
01:04:15,760 --> 01:04:19,240
But have you ever had to walk
away from a case?

1286
01:04:19,880 --> 01:04:22,800
There, there can be occasions
that you do, you know,

1287
01:04:22,800 --> 01:04:26,280
especially when a client has,
you know, is doing it for the

1288
01:04:26,280 --> 01:04:28,400
wrong reasons.
And we've, we've done what we

1289
01:04:28,400 --> 01:04:30,240
needed to do and there is
nothing more we can do.

1290
01:04:31,880 --> 01:04:33,960
Yeah, we can't.
We, I've, I've turned stuff

1291
01:04:33,960 --> 01:04:35,080
down.
You have to.

1292
01:04:35,080 --> 01:04:38,040
Give us an example if you can.
Well, when you've got someone

1293
01:04:38,040 --> 01:04:41,680
who's where, you know their
motive isn't necessarily what

1294
01:04:41,680 --> 01:04:46,200
they first initially wanted it
to be, or you've closed the case

1295
01:04:46,240 --> 01:04:49,240
and they want to continue.
More, more, more.

1296
01:04:49,480 --> 01:04:52,600
For the wrong reasons,
destroying someone because we've

1297
01:04:52,600 --> 01:04:54,000
won.
But you've there's, there's,

1298
01:04:54,240 --> 01:04:57,680
there's winning and closing and
then there's inappropriate

1299
01:04:58,080 --> 01:04:59,520
continuation.
Yes.

1300
01:04:59,520 --> 01:05:02,880
So you know, you've got you've
got to know as an investigator,

1301
01:05:02,880 --> 01:05:04,040
that's the judgement at the
beginning.

1302
01:05:04,040 --> 01:05:06,720
You've got to know what you're
doing it for and why and when.

1303
01:05:06,920 --> 01:05:08,760
So you walk away from that.
Yeah, Because remember I said

1304
01:05:08,760 --> 01:05:09,920
we'll come back to the
addictions.

1305
01:05:09,920 --> 01:05:11,440
I've got a question here.
What is it?

1306
01:05:12,080 --> 01:05:14,600
What does it look like when
someone becomes too addicted to

1307
01:05:14,600 --> 01:05:17,280
this whole surveillance thing?
And it it must be an, an

1308
01:05:17,280 --> 01:05:20,760
obsession, an addiction with
some, or you could get hooked.

1309
01:05:20,760 --> 01:05:23,920
It's almost like now that you
know, you want to know more, you

1310
01:05:23,920 --> 01:05:26,120
can use it now on that person or
on that person.

1311
01:05:26,680 --> 01:05:29,120
So that's also something that
you must be dealing with a lot

1312
01:05:29,120 --> 01:05:30,800
to try and manage.
Yeah.

1313
01:05:31,560 --> 01:05:33,240
Again.
So that's why you need to

1314
01:05:33,360 --> 01:05:35,760
onboard someone properly in the
1st place and you're doing the

1315
01:05:35,880 --> 01:05:38,000
the case in the investigation
for a reason.

1316
01:05:38,480 --> 01:05:43,280
And once that reason has been
identified and reported on, that

1317
01:05:43,280 --> 01:05:45,680
case is closed, unless there's
something else that's happened.

1318
01:05:45,960 --> 01:05:48,400
You can't continue it because
that's stalking harassment.

1319
01:05:48,560 --> 01:05:51,640
Can't just follow someone
forever for your pleasure, for

1320
01:05:51,640 --> 01:05:53,640
your voyeurism.
Pleasure to but.

1321
01:05:53,640 --> 01:05:55,160
There must be clients that want
to right?

1322
01:05:55,160 --> 01:05:57,400
Of course there are especially
those.

1323
01:05:57,400 --> 01:05:58,400
They've got the money to throw
at it as.

1324
01:05:58,400 --> 01:06:00,880
Well, with the resources, they
want to monitor whoever they're

1325
01:06:00,880 --> 01:06:03,800
monitoring forever.
You've got to have morals, you

1326
01:06:03,800 --> 01:06:06,640
know, ethics of, of steel.
You do the job you do.

1327
01:06:06,720 --> 01:06:09,000
Every investigator has this
moral compass and during the

1328
01:06:09,000 --> 01:06:11,960
case, it does this all the time
because yeah.

1329
01:06:12,000 --> 01:06:15,240
And, and you, you manage that,
that that's, that's part of

1330
01:06:15,600 --> 01:06:18,920
being skilled and experienced as
an investigator to keep that.

1331
01:06:19,280 --> 01:06:21,920
Where do you get your your
values, your ethics from?

1332
01:06:21,920 --> 01:06:24,120
Do you have religion?
Are you religious?

1333
01:06:24,120 --> 01:06:27,520
Do you, are you spiritual?
Like what keeps you AM?

1334
01:06:28,840 --> 01:06:33,080
I religious, I, I, I suppose I
am religious, you know, I, I

1335
01:06:33,080 --> 01:06:37,320
come from, I mean, where, where
are we going with this?

1336
01:06:37,320 --> 01:06:40,040
This is like just so.
Wherever you want.

1337
01:06:41,760 --> 01:06:43,240
We.
Have no boundaries in this.

1338
01:06:43,280 --> 01:06:45,120
Podcast, I think it's.
A straight up question.

1339
01:06:45,120 --> 01:06:46,120
Yeah, yeah.
No, no, I get it.

1340
01:06:46,600 --> 01:06:52,440
I, I affiliate myself with some
of the biggest leaders in the

1341
01:06:52,440 --> 01:06:54,440
industry and some of the mentors
before me.

1342
01:06:54,440 --> 01:06:57,480
So I, I, I give back.
I'm out there in the open.

1343
01:06:57,480 --> 01:06:59,920
So there's no, you know, so my
moral compass is there, my

1344
01:06:59,920 --> 01:07:02,440
reputation is there.
So it's there to be looked and

1345
01:07:02,440 --> 01:07:05,760
challenged.
So I every, whatever you do on a

1346
01:07:05,760 --> 01:07:08,760
daily basis, regardless of
whether it's speaking to a

1347
01:07:08,760 --> 01:07:14,960
client, your interactions here
online is, is you're going to be

1348
01:07:14,960 --> 01:07:16,800
judged.
And for me, I, I, I keep my

1349
01:07:16,800 --> 01:07:21,520
moral compass extremely focused,
yeah, clean and focused on, on

1350
01:07:21,520 --> 01:07:24,160
what I'm trying to do.
I love this industry and I give

1351
01:07:24,160 --> 01:07:26,720
back.
So that's why I sit on non

1352
01:07:26,840 --> 01:07:30,240
profit association boards to
give back to the industry.

1353
01:07:30,240 --> 01:07:33,760
You know you.
Really need to have it in line

1354
01:07:33,800 --> 01:07:37,440
and straight because the
temptations that come from all

1355
01:07:37,440 --> 01:07:40,200
of the money and the types of
clients that you, you, I know

1356
01:07:41,640 --> 01:07:44,000
that you're dealing with the
temptation.

1357
01:07:44,120 --> 01:07:46,960
You really cannot be weak
morally.

1358
01:07:46,960 --> 01:07:50,320
You can't be one of those people
that gets like a little feather

1359
01:07:50,320 --> 01:07:53,560
being blown around by the the
fad, the the money, the

1360
01:07:53,560 --> 01:07:56,520
pressure, whatever.
The other thing I've found is

1361
01:07:56,520 --> 01:08:04,320
with powerful clients is if you
stand up and provide the right

1362
01:08:04,680 --> 01:08:07,880
support for the right reasons
and justify your position, you

1363
01:08:07,880 --> 01:08:10,320
earn a lot more respect.
And that's my in my experience.

1364
01:08:10,320 --> 01:08:12,200
If you are, if you just say yes,
can you do it?

1365
01:08:12,200 --> 01:08:16,279
Yes, you're you're, you're not
being you're not challenging

1366
01:08:16,279 --> 01:08:19,960
your client in terms of
providing them the optimum

1367
01:08:19,960 --> 01:08:21,120
result.
You're.

1368
01:08:21,120 --> 01:08:23,720
Helping them by allowing them
that dark rabbit hole.

1369
01:08:23,760 --> 01:08:24,960
Just do that.
Yeah, yeah.

1370
01:08:25,080 --> 01:08:25,479
Off you go.
Do.

1371
01:08:25,479 --> 01:08:27,040
Surveillance.
I've told you to do that.

1372
01:08:27,040 --> 01:08:29,439
You just do that yeah.
You end up you you you're not a

1373
01:08:29,680 --> 01:08:33,800
effective solution provider.
You've just become another tool

1374
01:08:34,000 --> 01:08:37,359
in their arsenal.
So if you want to provide and an

1375
01:08:37,359 --> 01:08:41,880
effective solution, that's why
I'm, I'm very, I want to speak

1376
01:08:41,880 --> 01:08:43,279
to the ultimate client.
I need.

1377
01:08:43,279 --> 01:08:46,399
I don't, I'd rather speak to the
main decision maker rather than

1378
01:08:46,479 --> 01:08:50,439
aids advisors, support staff,
because this happens the Chinese

1379
01:08:50,439 --> 01:08:52,520
whisper by the time it gets back
to the client, just tell them to

1380
01:08:52,520 --> 01:08:56,040
do that.
And then I'd rather just give me

1381
01:08:56,080 --> 01:08:58,560
5 minutes and and and we've
we'll clear this all up.

1382
01:08:59,240 --> 01:09:06,479
Yeah, just stepping into this
one more, it's if you look at

1383
01:09:06,479 --> 01:09:10,520
your sort of baseline values and
ethics that you've got, did you

1384
01:09:10,520 --> 01:09:14,680
get them from your parents?
Did you get them?

1385
01:09:14,680 --> 01:09:17,840
Like how did you build your core
values?

1386
01:09:18,439 --> 01:09:21,080
So I'm from my father's Italian,
my mother's Spanish.

1387
01:09:21,080 --> 01:09:25,000
So I'm from a Mediterranean
background and, and family was

1388
01:09:25,840 --> 01:09:33,200
very important to us growing up.
And for me, everything that was

1389
01:09:33,200 --> 01:09:36,359
taught to me at a young age is
nothing's given to you.

1390
01:09:36,359 --> 01:09:39,880
You've got to go out there and
work, work for it and how you

1391
01:09:39,880 --> 01:09:44,960
work for it is up to you.
And all those steps from a young

1392
01:09:44,960 --> 01:09:47,920
age, being from parents that
were from different countries

1393
01:09:47,920 --> 01:09:50,840
coming to the UK with, with no
infrastructure, it was, you

1394
01:09:50,840 --> 01:09:54,320
know, you had to fight for your
reputation and your position and

1395
01:09:54,400 --> 01:09:59,160
and those that hard working
ethic, ethical mentality back

1396
01:09:59,160 --> 01:10:02,840
then had just been drilled into
me from a young age.

1397
01:10:02,840 --> 01:10:04,840
Fighting for your for your
clients now?

1398
01:10:05,000 --> 01:10:06,960
Yeah, still fighting.
Yeah, I still fight.

1399
01:10:06,960 --> 01:10:09,400
Fight for my clients, yeah.
And were your parents strict

1400
01:10:09,400 --> 01:10:13,240
with you?
Yeah, yeah, my dad was strict.

1401
01:10:13,520 --> 01:10:17,280
Yeah, yeah, I've got to say was
from a Sicilian man.

1402
01:10:17,280 --> 01:10:20,800
So, you know, not much.
Because I can tell that a little

1403
01:10:20,800 --> 01:10:22,080
bit.
We're speaking with you because,

1404
01:10:22,320 --> 01:10:28,400
and I like that there's a no
nonsense approach where there's

1405
01:10:28,400 --> 01:10:33,680
truth, there's fact.
There's no room for wishy washy

1406
01:10:33,880 --> 01:10:37,000
anything.
And like I say, you're the right

1407
01:10:37,000 --> 01:10:40,160
person for this kind of industry
because you've got to be solid

1408
01:10:40,160 --> 01:10:42,680
in that way.
If there's any weakness and

1409
01:10:42,680 --> 01:10:46,680
cracks in your values, in your
ethics, in the strictness of

1410
01:10:46,680 --> 01:10:50,600
what you need to do to deliver
for your clients, to work hard

1411
01:10:50,600 --> 01:10:53,280
for your clients so that they
have the best for them, which is

1412
01:10:53,280 --> 01:10:54,280
what your parents are still in
you.

1413
01:10:54,440 --> 01:10:57,440
If that's not correct,
everything crumbles.

1414
01:10:57,480 --> 01:11:00,080
Yeah, Yeah, that's right.
Yeah.

1415
01:11:00,720 --> 01:11:03,160
Mike, it's been terrific.
Having you thank.

1416
01:11:03,160 --> 01:11:04,320
You so much.
Thank you.

1417
01:11:04,480 --> 01:11:05,520
Really enjoyed it.
Thank you.